Returning to the most recent symposium, distributive justice is a difficult concept to approach with many different theories lending various ideas. Rawls presented distributive justice as decisions based on an ‘Original Position.’ He argued self-interested human beings would assign advantages to the least advantaged position because each of them could end up in that position. This Maximin Rule still leaves room for argument as people discuss what laws are truly just in their advantaging of the disadvantage. It appears to be an excellent method for determining laws, a method that balances the impracticalities of Marxism and the callousness of Nozick.
Rawls does not present a sufficient method to implement this in specific circumstances. For instance, most can understand that laws should be made so that they advantage the disadvantaged. The Original Position makes each presuppose the worst and therefore bolster that position. It is counterintuitive as self-interested creatures to minimize the maximums though. Rawls agrees with that position in so much as laws would not be made to cap the growth of the advantaged. Suppose however the world has a fixed quantity of liberty, an increase in one’s liberty corresponds to a decrease in another person’s. Most would agree that handicapped parking spaces provide a benefit to the disadvantaged and see this law as just. In another example, affirmative action promotes the welfare of the disadvantage, but it also heavily restricts the position of the advantaged. In the instance of handicapped parking spaces, the liberty cost for the advantage is not great; one parks a few spaces down and walks a few extra feet. On the other hand, many schools review economic and institutional factors that limit the number of students they can enroll, factors that coupled with affirmative action can deny an education to the advantaged despite comparable test scores. Walking a little further does not greatly harm the advantaged although it provides a great benefit to the disable; however, the loss of an education can be disastrous. Laws that benefit the disadvantaged inherently put a cost on the position of the advantaged. I would argue that the most just laws would minimize that cost on the advantaged position.
In the case of affirmative action, most would agree the notion of advantaging the position of disadvantaged persons is a justified cause; however, the problem with the theory is in its implementation. Is it just if it also denies an education to another person solely based on a discriminating factor like gender or race? The benefit of Nozick’s theories comes from their ability to be applied to specific cases. He admits its flaws though, citing that it fails at a systemic level. In order to apply affirmative action to Nozick, it is necessary to view admission to the schools almost as something “owned” by the College and “given” to the individual. Under that circumstance, most people would also agree that it is “just” for the school to be able to apportion their enrollment at their own choice. At a systemic level most would still consider it “unjust” to continue to widen the educational gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Both theories provide methods for distributive justice but exhibit flaws that prevent their implementation.
I think that there are some freedoms, some liberties, that are not, in economics jargon, "rival". That is, my having them does not affect your ability to have them. Take voting, for instance. No matter how much I vote, you can vote just as much.
ReplyDeleteBut you are right to say that some rights are rival, or at least not completely non-rival. Healthcare, for instance, is a rival commodity (if we consider it in the commodified conception of health insurance, hospital care, and pharmaceutical medicines). But I think there are ways to get around such a problem if we expand our conception of health for all. It could revolve around wellness instead of insurance.
I guess that's true, but in that case would Rawls say that laws which are "rival" are unjust? In effect something like a graduated income tax would then be unjust but a flat state sales tax is just since it is applied universally. We had the discussion that he would not want to "cap" the advantaged. In this case a flat-line tax could be disproportionatly spent towards programs for the disadvantaged and it still wouldn't be "unjust" in the since that it disadvantages the advantaged.
ReplyDeleteSince he's so vague I have a hard time understanding how it doesn't push towards homogeny. He says that a gap will exist because humans are self-interested but I think it is more natural to assume that in the Original Position everyone would choose to be equal.
"...I think it is more natural to assume that in the Original Position everyone would choose to be equal."
ReplyDeleteIt seems like Rawls does arrange for a certain type of equality with the Liberty Principle. But this is not to be violated, even though the Difference Principle arranges for the maximin rule. So basically I think you're right that people would want to be equal, although this doesn't exclude the maximin quality because of the type of equality in effect.