The Great American Synthesis

Much of Wednesday's symposium was spent in criticizing Nozick's view that notions of distributive justice should not applied on the systemic level since rectifying systemic inequalities necessarily involves violating the rights of those who are entitled to their holdings. Marx and Rawls are united in this opposition since both philosophers are concerned with the justice of the system as whole rather than merely individual holdings. Yet Rawls and Nozick are actually closer to one another in their vision for society than either is to Marx; both are part of the broader classical liberal tradition that recognizes the importance of individual rights. An understanding of the philosophies espoused by Rawls and Nozick is key to appreciating the actual operation of democratic governance, in the United States in particular, which incorporates elements of both. The two viewpoints, though contradictory, form two sides of the same coin and are arguably both vital parts of the American character.

Nozick might be held to represent the libertarian or conservative element of liberalism, whereas Rawls' ideas are more amenable to egalitarian or progressive liberalism. The tension between these two goals of liberty and equality is palpable in many of the most divisive political questions in modern America, with current health care reform efforts perhaps being the most obvious. The rallying cry of its opponents is liberty: liberty against government intrusion in the marketplace, liberty against government regulation of private behavior, liberty against taxation to pay for it. Conversely its proponents are concerned with equality, feeling that some basic level of care must be available to all irrespective of their economic status. One’s position on the issue effectively rests on which trade-off of liberty versus equality one prefers.

Yet virtually everyone would agree that liberty and equality are both central principles for our society, and the tension between the two is healthy. One of Nozick’s better observations is that “there is no central distribution” determining who receives what in a free society, meaning that state power cannot be used to infinitely mold the distribution system without violating the rights of individuals to what they have justly earned. Limited government, indeed, is a bedrock principle of the American experiment. Yet at the same time most would acknowledge that the liberty of individuals is constrained by factors beyond their control (primarily economic disadvantage, in the realm of government policy) and that providing some basic level of social support for them is just. This view, of course, is essentially Rawlsian, and to the extent that government action determines the conditions under which individuals make their choices, his principle of structuring inequalities to better the lot of the least advantaged is a good one. The two governing philosophies serve to check the excesses of one another; Nozickian notions of individual entitlement helps prevent infinite interference from government pursuing Rawlsian ends, and a Rawlsian concern for the disadvantaged helps prevent the cruelest inequities of a purely Nozickian system. One may think that more of one or the other is needed, but the synthesis between them is vital for a healthy free society.