Separation of Church and State: The Myth

Last class we discussed various issues at the forefront of many recent political debates, addressing them from both the conservative and liberal sides. However, the arguments on certain issue discussed had a moral tinge to one or both sides’ points. One person even brought up the fact that religion has more to do with a person’s view on certain issues than the way they identify themselves politically. This statement lead me to the question as to whether some sort of separation of church and state is possible.

In a realistic sense, our morals are usually based on our faith or religion and since laws are usually based off of some sort of moral, religion cannot be separate from the state law making process. While I would not suggest that those in charge of making laws should put aside their personal beliefs when implementing laws, protecting the rights of American citizens should be the guiding force for laws rather than their religious convictions.

For example, during the race for the Republican presidential nomination, Mitt Romney used his Mormon faith as the reason he voted in favor of state laws regulating abortion. As a non-denominational Christian, I’m not entirely sure of the doctrines of various churches regarding the issue of abortion. However, even though I support the woman’s right to choose, I view abortions as morally wrong. Granted I’m not government official with the ability to influence policies, I personally feel that if I can separate my own personal convictions about the issue to support something that protects the rights of women, those with influence should be able to do so as well.

JFK once said he believed in an America where separation of church and state was absolute. I hate to burst his bubble, but no such America exists…and most likely never will.

The Rawls and Nozick Puzzle

Returning to the most recent symposium, distributive justice is a difficult concept to approach with many different theories lending various ideas. Rawls presented distributive justice as decisions based on an ‘Original Position.’ He argued self-interested human beings would assign advantages to the least advantaged position because each of them could end up in that position. This Maximin Rule still leaves room for argument as people discuss what laws are truly just in their advantaging of the disadvantage. It appears to be an excellent method for determining laws, a method that balances the impracticalities of Marxism and the callousness of Nozick.

Rawls does not present a sufficient method to implement this in specific circumstances. For instance, most can understand that laws should be made so that they advantage the disadvantaged. The Original Position makes each presuppose the worst and therefore bolster that position. It is counterintuitive as self-interested creatures to minimize the maximums though. Rawls agrees with that position in so much as laws would not be made to cap the growth of the advantaged. Suppose however the world has a fixed quantity of liberty, an increase in one’s liberty corresponds to a decrease in another person’s. Most would agree that handicapped parking spaces provide a benefit to the disadvantaged and see this law as just. In another example, affirmative action promotes the welfare of the disadvantage, but it also heavily restricts the position of the advantaged. In the instance of handicapped parking spaces, the liberty cost for the advantage is not great; one parks a few spaces down and walks a few extra feet. On the other hand, many schools review economic and institutional factors that limit the number of students they can enroll, factors that coupled with affirmative action can deny an education to the advantaged despite comparable test scores. Walking a little further does not greatly harm the advantaged although it provides a great benefit to the disable; however, the loss of an education can be disastrous. Laws that benefit the disadvantaged inherently put a cost on the position of the advantaged. I would argue that the most just laws would minimize that cost on the advantaged position.

In the case of affirmative action, most would agree the notion of advantaging the position of disadvantaged persons is a justified cause; however, the problem with the theory is in its implementation. Is it just if it also denies an education to another person solely based on a discriminating factor like gender or race? The benefit of Nozick’s theories comes from their ability to be applied to specific cases. He admits its flaws though, citing that it fails at a systemic level. In order to apply affirmative action to Nozick, it is necessary to view admission to the schools almost as something “owned” by the College and “given” to the individual. Under that circumstance, most people would also agree that it is “just” for the school to be able to apportion their enrollment at their own choice. At a systemic level most would still consider it “unjust” to continue to widen the educational gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Both theories provide methods for distributive justice but exhibit flaws that prevent their implementation.

an interesting synthesis

After a long while of class time, and thinking about the different means of distributive justice, I have come to a small but I feel important personal solution. I feel that, in a world where one person has billions of dollars, and in the same society that there are people who cannot afford even to eat, that this is unjust. I don’t think anyone (except maybe the person who has the “diamond tweezers case (-Smith))” would see this as fair, or just in any way. I definitely do that that those people should be able to eat, but at the same time I don’t think that the wealthy person, no matter how wealthy, should be subjected to the redistribution of his funds if they are acquired justly.

I think this is the reason that it is of the up most importance to inspect the work of Robert Nozik. Of course, you have all been in class with me so you know the principle behind Nozik’s ideas. But, in case you don’t here is a recap. 1.there must be justice in acquisition. 2. There must be justice in transfer. 3. When ether one of these rules is broken there must be some type of system to rectify the injustice done.

Therefore if the government took money from its people in the form of taxation in order to redistribute this money, this would be an unjust acquisition, and the second of nozkis rules would be broken, and this injustice must be rectified. This poses a problem obviously. Without taxation government cannot run and essentially would break down into anarchy. Where upon at this point the law of the land would become simply who ever was the wealthiest.

However, I also believe that the government should provide basic needs for the people like, roads, protection, and water, just to name a few. But, the problem is that to provide these things the government must take taxes from its people. I mean lets face it; taxes are only used to provide people with the things they cannot afford. For example rich people have no trouble buying anything they want. The government collects taxes from these people so that the government gives them the people that cannot afford them on their own. Nozik would say that the acquisition in this case is unjust, but from a moral standpoint it is very just so here we have a quandary. To me it seems that a minimax rule (like Rawls) coupled with the laws of Nozik would make for a very interesting system.

Plato is a Fascist

Today in class we tried to determine where philosophers fell on the political spectrum. We spent a couple minutes thinking aloud about where some philosophers fit, but we ran out of time. I think it deserves a little more attention.

It is especially difficult to determine where philosophers fall into the political spectrum. They do not neatly fall into an ideology (except Marx, of course) but I think I’ll give it a shot.

Today we talked about Plato being conservative or authoritarian. We concluded that he favors a meritocracy (which may indicate conservatism) but he also gives political power to the elites, the philosopher kings (which is authoritarian)

I think that Plato is more than just conservative. His views are too extreme to fall under that category. Similarly, labeling him as “authoritarian” is too vague. That term does not mean much of anything (since the term “authoritarian” describes the qualities of a political system. Authoritarianism is not a particular ideology like classical liberalism or communism).

Bertrand Russell, being the pompous jackass that he is, likened Plato to a “modern day fascist” in his History of Western Philosophy. I think Russell on to something. From the selection we read in class, Plato seems to advocate a fascist-like political system.

But before I talk about Plato’s fascism, I probably should briefly cover fascism.

In the 20^th century, there were two decent examples of fascist states: Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Italy (it should be noted that although the Nazi’s were called socialists by name, they were a fascist party under Hitler)

Fascist states have common features. They often believe in the superiority of a particular race. Fascists value certain races or classes above others. Thus, they create a social hierarchy to separate the superior from the inferior. In some cases, fascist states advocate eugenics as also a solution for purging society of the “lesser race/s.”

Fascist states are also characterized by strong governments controlled by a few elites. They are generally ruled by one or several people. To win support or compliance from the masses, they rely on propaganda. Through this indoctrination, they can maintain power and keep the lower classes “in their place.”

I. The Superiority of the Philosopher Kings

Plato’s city, as described in The Republic, has a number of these fascist characteristics. He believes in the superiority of the Philosopher Kings. According to Plato, the philosopher kings would rule the city. It is an authoratarian rule (as opposed to a democratic one). They would hold the power and influence, so they could rule the lower classes of society without any sorts of checks and balances.

However, Plato’s notion concerning the superiority of the guardians extends beyond the political realm. He believed that only the philosopher kings went to heaven when they died. They would ascend into heaven and live among the gods; while other (lower) classes were reincarnated as animals. Clearly, Plato valued the guardians over the classes of society not just politically, but in every way. By doing this, he assigned a value to certain groups of people.

In The History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell points out that Plato deals with the weak in a harsh, fascist-like manner. Plato advocates the use of eugenics to weed out the weak. In the Republic, he argues that children that are physically or mentally handicapped are to be “put away in some mysterious or unknown place, as they ought to be.” (112) The goal is to rid society of the sick and inferior. The elimination of the weak and handicapped was a policy also used by both Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

II. Propaganda and Plato

To mandate compliance from the subjects, the philosopher kings indoctrinated the lower classes. The guardians would tell a “noble lie” to maintain the status quo. They tell the subjects that their status in society was in accordance with God’s will. God chose who would be the gold people, the silver, and the brass people. Plato argued that this myth would be accepted after only a few generations. By telling the auxiliaries and craftspeople that they were biologically inferior, the elites stressed the superiority of a class. The guardians secured their role as the powerful and chosen leaders of the city.

Similarly, the Nazi’s created a cult of personality around Adolf Hitler. Hitler was treated like a god. Each year on his birthday, the state mandated that the German citizens must pray for their Fuhrer. He was a god-like figure in Germany.

Plato’s Fascism

Plato’s city clearly has fascist political leanings. The commonalities between the City and other fascist states are clear. Like Nazi’s and Italians under Mussolini, Plato stresses the political and biological superiority of the elites, advocates eugenics for weeding out the weak, and he supports the use of propaganda to indoctrinate the lower rungs of society.

Russel was right. Plato was similar to a modern day fascist.

Kelsen, moral relativism, and Existentialism -- A responsible philosophy

Last year I took Dr. Johnson's Existentialism class, and now reading Kelsen, I see a lot of overlapping ideas in the philosophies. The moral relativism that Kelsen is known for and Existentialism are often given bad raps of being philosophies that rely too much on the individual, and inevitably never really stand for anything. However, it is important to remember that existentialism does not say that there are no objective truths, only that the Truth is not objective. I think some people look at existentialism as a depressing philosophy because it seems like people are alone, every man for himself, but perhaps instead it could be looked at as a philosophy that makes people responsible, because they give value to things, and they are responsible to themselves to follow it. And this is exactly what moral relativism does alos. Like in existentialism, it takes away the "chicken door" of God or reason or human nature. It strips away all the other things that could possibly explain or be an excuse for our actions. So what is left are humans who must make moral decisions about what is just, and what is the right way to live and they are the only ones that can be held accountable for their actions.

The problem that I am left with is the question that we began to ponder in class on Friday. How do we pass judgment? Especially in terms of international law, if all states are seen as sovereign, and all have their own ideals of what basic human rights are, how can one state tell another that they're wrong? And he can we justify intervention? What makes our beliefs more important than anyone elses? In dealing with international issues, isn't there something enticing and maybe even worthwhile about creating more objective ways to look at justice? Is this what bodies such as the United Nations are trying to do?

While I very much like Existentialism, and Kelsen's philosophy of moral relativism, there seem to be times when it is more comforting, and even downright more practical to have objective, black and white rules that everyone must abide by. But I realize then brings up the tricky part that we've been grappling with all semester, of who should make those rules? And I don't have an easy answer for that. In a perfect world, I think that moral relativism would work perfectly, and it woud be wonderful to have a whole bunch of rules that people made up for themselves, and everyone follows along with their own ideals, but I worry that our imperfect world, a system such as that would be very messy.

The Great American Synthesis

Much of Wednesday's symposium was spent in criticizing Nozick's view that notions of distributive justice should not applied on the systemic level since rectifying systemic inequalities necessarily involves violating the rights of those who are entitled to their holdings. Marx and Rawls are united in this opposition since both philosophers are concerned with the justice of the system as whole rather than merely individual holdings. Yet Rawls and Nozick are actually closer to one another in their vision for society than either is to Marx; both are part of the broader classical liberal tradition that recognizes the importance of individual rights. An understanding of the philosophies espoused by Rawls and Nozick is key to appreciating the actual operation of democratic governance, in the United States in particular, which incorporates elements of both. The two viewpoints, though contradictory, form two sides of the same coin and are arguably both vital parts of the American character.

Nozick might be held to represent the libertarian or conservative element of liberalism, whereas Rawls' ideas are more amenable to egalitarian or progressive liberalism. The tension between these two goals of liberty and equality is palpable in many of the most divisive political questions in modern America, with current health care reform efforts perhaps being the most obvious. The rallying cry of its opponents is liberty: liberty against government intrusion in the marketplace, liberty against government regulation of private behavior, liberty against taxation to pay for it. Conversely its proponents are concerned with equality, feeling that some basic level of care must be available to all irrespective of their economic status. One’s position on the issue effectively rests on which trade-off of liberty versus equality one prefers.

Yet virtually everyone would agree that liberty and equality are both central principles for our society, and the tension between the two is healthy. One of Nozick’s better observations is that “there is no central distribution” determining who receives what in a free society, meaning that state power cannot be used to infinitely mold the distribution system without violating the rights of individuals to what they have justly earned. Limited government, indeed, is a bedrock principle of the American experiment. Yet at the same time most would acknowledge that the liberty of individuals is constrained by factors beyond their control (primarily economic disadvantage, in the realm of government policy) and that providing some basic level of social support for them is just. This view, of course, is essentially Rawlsian, and to the extent that government action determines the conditions under which individuals make their choices, his principle of structuring inequalities to better the lot of the least advantaged is a good one. The two governing philosophies serve to check the excesses of one another; Nozickian notions of individual entitlement helps prevent infinite interference from government pursuing Rawlsian ends, and a Rawlsian concern for the disadvantaged helps prevent the cruelest inequities of a purely Nozickian system. One may think that more of one or the other is needed, but the synthesis between them is vital for a healthy free society.

I want to Fish for Fun

While discussing Marx has become almost an exhausted topic, I would still like to give some thought to the topic. One of the points in many of the arguments against Marx has been that his concepts do not allow for innovation to remain a priority within a society. I find this point to be a perfect representation of what Capitalism inspires within the minds of its supporters - the necessity of advancement and excess in resources.

As Mr. Varma pointed out in one of his comments, if the world was willing then every human on the planet would be able to have over four pounds of food every day. Now certainly I am not naive enough to believe that we could solve this problem with the flip of a switch, but that does not mean that this is an impossibility. I agree with professor Johnson that we should not limit our minds to think that these problems have no solution. Capitalism limits our minds to thinking in a mindset that primarily takes into account cost-benefits and production rates.

The Story that Brendan discusses in one of his comments about the German and American fishermen is a story I take to heart. Many Americans scoff at the German, believing our superior reasoning to be infallible and that it is foolish that he would not be interested in turning a profit.

I apologize ahead of time because the rest of my post is somewhat of a rant. PROFIT is not the only purpose within the life of a human being! The thought that maximizing my economic potential and my "value" is the primary goal in life causes a nauseating feeling to rise in me. I believe that a society so steeped in profit and economic gain often forgets that we do not have a need for a six-bedroom home when one has a family of four. Why can we not be satisfied with the simple pleasures in life? The German fisherman understands! He is content with fishing as a pleasurable activity. The American wants to hire other fisherman, turn the act into a means of gaining money, and therefore removing the human aspect of fishing and introducing a world of anxiety and business.

Many in our class have probably been stressing over midterms. One of the reasons for this and the stress we experience on on a daily basis related to schoolwork is because we are horrified of what lies after college or grad school - an occupation. If our society were more similar to Marx' concept then this stress would be alleviated, because everyone would receive what they need, regardless of their occupation. But in a Capitalist society that is focused on competition within the work force, it is a scary world. Imagine if there was no fear that you would be able to provide for yourself and your family no matter what occurred in school or your occupation?

Nozick and Chaos

When we were discussing Nozick’s entitlement theory, I found the idea of repeatedly applying the initial conditions for just holdings – as in the Wilt Chamberlain problem – a particularly intriguing method of underscoring the fallacy that plagues nearly all patterned systems of distribution. Namely, that end state principals are corrupted by voluntary action, whereas the entitlement theory embraces such changes. The interesting thing is that Nozick’s predilection for initial conditions is something that is reminiscent of the mathematics that underlies the chaos theory. And while the comparison leaves much to want, a loose juxtaposition between the mathematics and the philosophy does provide some insight as to why initial conditions can be so important in natural systems.

Chaos theory has become a science which studies deterministic systems sensitive to initial conditions. Yes, this is the theory that caused Jurassic Park to close, made a few other less exciting movies, and created the saying ‘the flap of a butterfly’s wings in New York could cause a hurricane in Tokyo.’ However, it is also the reason why we cannot predict the weather much more than a week in advance or predict how water might drip from a faucet. For example, up until the early 1960’s it was believed that with a near infinite number of weather sensors covering the earth would enable one to predict the weather several months or a year in advance. But given such a system, no number of sensors would work because each measurement necessarily overlooks small amounts of information until the numbers driving the system produce a model drastically different from the real thing.

More importantly however, chaotic systems emerge not only on the terms of mathematical equations but also in the context of space and time. As their permutations grow and expand, the outputs become more complex and unpredictable. In a similar fashion, Nozick’s balancing of justice on initial conditions produces a system that does not attempt to control free will, but the ultimate success of this construct is largely left to chance (as long as the movements are just of course). In this way it is apparent that the manner in which the initial holdings are arranged becomes totally occluded by chance and time. Thus the question becomes: Do you wish to have a system where equality is ultimately decided by natural interactions, or would you prefer a mode of organization that imposes upon human will a pattern of distribution? Political ideologies aside, which do you think is more rational?

Rawls...

ok so I really like the thoughts that Rawls has on justice. I think that it makes complete sense to have the rules set so that no one can be too much worse off than another. This would ideally end all poverty and distribute the wealth, not equally, but enough so that everyone can live comfortably. The best off do not need to have the millions upon millions that the do in our society, it is just plain unnecessary. Also, I like the idea that when deciding if something is just the first and most important thing to look at are those that have the least. The people who are comfortable do not really have much to complain about, but those who don’t are the ones who really need to be looked at. I also think that this goes beyond wealth. For instance, those in school who struggle should be given the most attention (assuming they are trying to do well) because it is important not to let them fall through the cracks. The children who are already flourishing obviously still need guidance, but I do not think they deserve all the attention just because the teacher may think they may achieve great things in the future. That will come to them naturally, in all likelihood. This is just one example that backs up Rawls, but there are plenty more which could do the same.

The idea of original position also agrees with me. If a society could look at everyone regardless of social status, gender, race, ect I think everyone would agree we as a society would be much better off. Rawls seems to be one of the few people we have read who truly looks out for the "little guy" and, personally, I like where he is going with it. I will admit that there are some flaws within his reasoning, as some have been mentioned in earlier posts, but for the most part he seems to have a very solid base that appears to be extremely logical, at least on paper. I will admit that creating a society that strictly follows his rules would be rather difficult to create, and many would protest as it seems as though it would be impossible for some to be as wealthy as they are today, but as I said on paper it seems to make a lot of sense.

Nozick's Baseline

To begin, Nozick has three rules for justice:

1.) Thing not previously owned by anyone may be aquired.
2.) Possession of items may be transferred from one person to another.
3.) Anything that violates rules 1 or 2 must be rectified.

Nozick is like Locke, who Nozick believed to have said that a person has a right to own what he makes and to appropriate anything that is not already owned as long as he leaves enough for the good others. That is, the amount of property that should be left is the amount that would leave others enough that they would not be harmed or their condition worsened.

Something just seems wrong, in Nozick, to me. He seems to believe that everyone has a right to be free from the coercion of others and to acquire and dispose of property as one sees fit, as long as it does not lessen the condition of others by acquiring it. An example of this, I suppose, would be if I bought the utilities in Monopoly and shut off all of the electricity and water to a small town- now the people there have no water or electric because I own it and turn it off. This would be wrong, for Nozick (but so good for Monopoly). Nozick seems to believe that people are entitled to things based on talents and abilities, according to what they can make, get or buy with their skills and talents. After they posses these things, they can keep them, sell them, or give them away. Basically, anyone should be able to keep what they earn or are given, as in the D2 example today.

I am in my secondary application phase for several medical schools right now and the words on everyone's tongue are care ethics and healthcare reform. After today’s class and thinking about the D2 example, how much doctors make, and the poor care many Americans are receiving today, I am left wondering if doctors and insurance companies are leaving enough for individuals so that their conditions are not lessened. I believe many doctors are guilty of taking their talents and exploiting them to the point that individuals are put into conditions far below any reasonable baseline (which I think Nozick fails to produce for us) for quality conditions. I have had the fortunate opportunity to work with many doctors of osteopathic medicine who work with patients when paying for expenses out-of-pocket. Some ask how much patients can afford to give or if they can a lower expense in a series of payments. What happened to the days when people would take livestock or produce to local healers for payment and the greatest payment healers received was being part of a healthy community (with a few sheep and carrots, mind you) that cared for them in return? We need to stop asking how much we can take from people until they reach the baseline of standard living and do our jobs with a different spirit that speaks to our conscience instead of our pocket books? Why do sports stars need to make millions a year? Why would any doctor need to make a net profit of $350,000+ per year? We must quit asking how much can we take from an individual before their condition is severely lessened. It seems fairly simple.

Question about Kant...

I know to speak on Kant is going back a bit in the class, but he’s the one who really stuck with me.

I’ve been thinking lately on his world with the categorical imperative and all, and I wonder if it, although it would be a just society, would it not be an extremely awkward society to live in? And would there not be a social rift because of the extensive amount of truth? I’m not in any way advocating lying, but thinking about the way people react to the truth, and how many humans would rather not hear it, if we were in that kind of society where there was nothing but, would there be any meaningful connection made between people?

Granted, if the society began in this Kantian fashion, people would not know lies and be accustomed to the truth, sure. But I still cannot think that we would be so accustomed to it that we would so easily accept it. I feel like humans as a whole are too proud and easily offended to survive a brutally honest society. Or, because of this difference in truth, would we become hardened to it, and able to accept it coldly? I just feel the social connection that people form would be so much harder to obtain, since there’s that huge possibility of getting constantly offended.

Sorry to ramble on like this, I just am not sure that society would emotionally survive something like Kant’s system of nothing but truth.

Creeoing Socialism might be the answer

The term “creeping socialism” is a term with very negative connotations. It implies a slow, but certain autonomy of the state that ensures the death of any capitalist elements in a society. This term doesn’t necessarily deserve the bad reputation it has come to hold. The “creeping socialism” in America and other Western countries has led to labor protection laws and less exploitation. There is arguably more infrastructure for economic exploitation in third-world countries than before, but socialism has also curbed this. So much information is available to the everyday citizen through the Internet, that more and more people are seeing the consequences of their lifestyles. Conversely, the exploited are able to see the chance for improvement from their current situation. Yes, only a few (on either side) will act, but those acts will have a major cumulative effect.
This begs the question as to how far do we go with socialism? Is a fully Marxist state just, or even possible? There will always be someone, or some state, that will exploit another, so global Marxism cannot be achieved. This argument does not debunk Marxism as an unjust system though. If the world cannot be fully Marxist, then what level can we achieve?
In class, a multitude of oppositions were brought against Marxism. Most were on the level of implementation. Can the world sustain Marxism economically, or even environmentally? One cannot necessarily think this way when dealing with Marxism because if the shift is gradual, then there is a good chance that solutions to these problems would arise as time goes on. Capitalism as we think of it today was gradually implemented as well.
For the arguments sake, let’s say that Marxism can be implemented, and try to answer the question of whether or not it can sustain itself for a prolonged period of history. People will always try to exploit others for their own gain, and to think of a time when all are enlightened to “do their share for the community” is fallacy. To survive, Marxism must be able to withstand exploitation from an outside, non-Marxist state (let’s call that state Z.) If a Marxist state depends on state Z for a natural resource, how would the Marxist state respond to being exploited? If state Z raises the tariffs on a necessary resource for the Marxist state, what power does it have to defend itself? It has the option to either exploit state Z by attempting the same tariff-raising, or it can go to war. If it attempts to raise it’s tariffs in return, it is exploiting country Z. Then, can a Marxist country go to war?
Marxism must be a revolutionary occurrence worldwide in order to avoid being overtaken by another non-Marxist country. As stated in class, this seems very unlikely in a globalized world, so Marxism must be gradual. If Marxism must be gradual, then perhaps the world is on it’s way there.

Reason-based Justice

During yesterday’s class on Rawls, Doctor J mentioned that Rawls’ theory of justice is based on the rationality of the people creating that society. The presence of reason at the foundation of this system reminded me of Kant’s rationality-heavy theory of justice. I just found it interesting how both specifically identified reason as the one thing all men have in common, and therefore what just societies must be based upon.

As we discussed with Kant, he states that a person with reason, thinking rationally, will have to support and adhere to the Categorical Imperative (to act only in such a way that you can will the maxim of your action as a universal law) and his three conditions for justice to apply. Therefore, just actions can be viewed as rational, while unjust actions are seen as irrational. Kant even states that justice can only be defined using pure reason, as opposed to empirical principles.

For Rawls, the Original Position establishes the rules that rational people would all agree to under the veil of ignorance. Rawls argues that those people would choose the Maximin Rule to maximize the minimums. According to Rawls, it is most just and rational to arrange societal rules to maximize the advantage of those in the worst positions in society, which provides a type of safety net for everyone since the veil of ignorance keeps people from knowing their place in the new society.

Because the people forming the future society are rational, they will adopt and develop the two principles through which society will successfully function. The Liberty Principle, in which all have equal right to the same kinds of liberties that are compatible with everyone having those liberties, can’t be justified if violated. Then, Rawls introduces the Difference Principle, under which social and economic inequalities must be arranged so that they a) are to the greatest benefit t the least advantaged, and b) are attached to offices/positions that are open to all (equality of opportunity). Rawls assumes that there will always be inequality in society, but that it is rational to implement the Maximin Rule to minimize the effect of differences on the liberties of citizens. Rational people, according to Rawls, will say that this system is the most just organization of society.

I find it interesting that both Rawls and Kant, while providing two very different versions of justice and just societies, base their theories on man’s most primary commonality: reason. After reading Hume’s essay, which focused on sympathy and fellow-feeling to validate justice in society, I really think that Rawls and Kant make more sense, and seem to be argued more solidly, because of this basis upon rationality.

Disadvantaged Become Advantaged

I know during the last class we decided that the part of Rawls’ Difference Principle stating that inequalities should be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged was in fact just. However, I’m still having trouble accepting that this is just. If the system is set up to where those that are the least advantaged benefit, those that are neither highly advantaged nor disadvantaged will still suffer.

An example I think of where the least advantaged benefit and those who are slightly more advantaged suffer is the public education system’s reduced lunch plan. For students whose parents make $14,079 a year, they can receive free lunch provided by their school. However, if a students parents make $14,080 a year, the parents must pay for their child’s lunch. A dollar extra a year does not make up for the amount of money the second set of parents would have to pay.

With this situation in mind, I have a hard time believing that a system where there is the greatest benefit for the least advantaged is just. The second set of parents must suffer due the system being set up according to Rawls’ theory whereas the first set of parents will be better off in the long run. Since one set would benefit while the other must suffer, the system is indeed unjust. Rawls’ theory is logical in the sense that everyone is covered if anything were to happen and they were to become disadvantaged. By providing a safety net, the society could continue to flourish despite the changes. I just personally feel that trying to implement such a system justly would be impossible since at one point, the benefits the disadvantaged received would be greater than those who are slightly more advantaged.

The Original Position

So this idea of the Original Position is a pretty sweet way to think about what justice really is. At the very least, it seems to be the most rational way to figure out what is most important to a just society. The "veil of ignorance" allows for subjective interests and discriminating factors to be ignored temporarily while the important thoughts are being thunk. But it seems like this veil of ignorance is necessary because of human nature, which tends toward personal interests. And it sort-of seems to me that that tendency is the main reason why there will always be conflict between people and the structures set up (by those people) to restrict that very same tendency.
So there we are (the proverbial We, that is), sitting amidst of all of our social structures and history and everything, and we want pure justice. Not the discolored crap that our current situation creates, but the pure stuff. So we try to imagine what we would do if we were completely detached from everything that is our capitalist, selfish, individual selves. We want to ignore all of the influences we tend to feel when dealing with rules and privileges or the lack thereof (maybe a computer is the answer! But that's a quick shortcut toward the Matrix). It seems like that fact that the Original Position never really exists points to the implausibility of it all. Even if we were to use this awesome tool to put together the perfectly ideal, just society, we would have a terrible time trying to make the transition from where we are now to wherever that would be. It's similar to the way that a lot of people will agree that perfect equality and a totally communist society seems great, but the transition from having private property to making everything state-owned is too difficult to imagine, much less consider actualizing. So I guess my question is this: Is the attempt to put together a just society using an imaginary situation as the base just an exercise in futility? Is that nothing more than fantasy?

Echoes of Plato and Aristotle in Marxist Philosophy

I had to reach way back in our justice files for this post, but I think these are useful comparisons. First of all, I am not claiming that the views of Marx, Plato, and Aristotle are congruent or that their philosophies are similar in a general sense. I only wish to point out some parallels in the details of their ultimately divergent conclusions.

In Book IV, Plato describes a conversation in which Socrates schools Glaucon in the ways of justice. In building up his conception of the soul as different parts analogous to the workings of a city, Socrates makes two assertions:

1) “The power that consists in everyone’s doing his own work rivals wisdom, moderation, and courage in its contribution to the virtue of the city” (59).
2) “Meddling and exchange between these three classes, then, is the greatest harm that can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst thing someone could do to it” (60).

In a Marxist society, the first claim would be universally accepted. If every citizen were free to pursue his or her passions, no one would experience the four types of alienation that result from work in a capitalist economy; thus, the general public would be happier and (as Marx presumed) more productive. However, the steps necessary to reach this stage of communism are wholly inconsistent with Plato’s second claim. According to him, there are three classes, and the society prospers only if every person is able to do his or her own life’s work within his or her assigned class. The society cannot be successful if people strive for social mobility; indeed, “these exchanges and this sort of meddling bring the city to ruin” (60). For Marx, the first principle is possibly only in a classless society. An extreme overhaul of the class system is the only way to achieve a state in which everyone can effectively and harmoniously contribute to the betterment of society, for only in a classless society can “the productive forces [increase] with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly” (181). In this case, Plato’s thesis and Marx’s antithesis, while in agreement over what is best for individual citizens, cannot be synthesized due to their opposing conceptions of a just society.

As for Aristotle, there are definite similarities between his notion of distributive justice and Marx’s defense of the “right of inequality.” Aristotle says that wealth should be distributed in direct proportion to merit, and justice exists between excess and deficiency. This, of course, is called a meritocracy; however, it is not completely incompatible with communism. In a Marxist system of course class differences would not be an issue, but such a system “recognizes unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges” (181). He acknowledges the injustice, for example, in distributing the same amount of resources to two workers, one single and self-reliant and the other supporting a family, the single man has more for himself and is thus richer, living in excess of his needs. In order to avoid what he terms “defects” such as this, Marx concedes that “right instead of being equal would have to be unequal” (181), even in a communist state. I think this idea shows that Marx, radical though he was, had not completely abandoned or ignored what Aristotle considered implicit in human nature: “For everyone agrees that what is just in distribution must fit some sort of worth” (78). By this principle, even in a communist society that seeks to equalize people as much as possible, there is still stratification in distribution, as inequality is inherent not in regard socioeconomic status but in individuals’ abilities and circumstances.

a personal experience to open my eyes

In class the other day, I think we can safely say we were pretty hard on Marx. By the end of class Dr.J had one thing left to say: “Just be a little more open minded, Please don’t underestimate your ability to make the world a better place.” I don’t know about anyone else, but this really hit home with me. I think like many people I am adverse to Marx on the front end, but the things that we discussed in class, and some things that I have talked with Dr.J about outside of class made me see Marx, and communism for that matter, in a different light.

Now I think like some people in our class I am pretty adverse to the ideas of communism, and the way it is affecting America these days. With all the stuff we see in the media talking about nationalized health care, and more socialist/ communist principles leaking their way into our way of life it is hard to ignore communism anymore. Most recently I have been wary of socialized medicine entering into our society. However, something that happened to me this week made me think twice about my stance on the issue.

On Tuesday I talked to my mom. We went through the usual stuff about how everyone was, and how everyone at home was doing. Then after talking for about thirty minutes she told me something very disconcerting. In short, what she told me was that for the past two and a half weeks, my family did not have health insurance. I was shocked of course, and asked her if it was back on now, she said it was. But, then I started thinking about the range of things that could have happened in thoughts to weeks, and how not having health care could have ruined my bright (Rhodes) future.

I started thinking about the fact that if during those two weeks, me or any member of my family had had lets say… a car wreck, nothing life threatening, or even too serious, and for them to be back safe at home would have cost a low medical bill of say $50,000. Now I don’t know about most people out there but my family just doesn’t have 50,000 dollars lying around to pay sudden medical bills with. I would no longer have had the money to stay in school I would have had to drop out get a job at the nearest wal-mart or burger joint, just to put food on the table, and hopefully if im really lucky my parents would get to keep their house. It suddenly made the issue of national health care very real to me, and now I don’t know how I feel about it. But, Dr.J will be glad to know that it did open my eyes just a little bit more.

Socialism in Theory, History, and Future?

Although the title is long, please be assured that this post will be short and (hopefully) sweet. My argument, as the title states, is really just the application of a one sentence quotation from our Marx reading:

Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby.(181)

To unpack this sentence, let me put it this way: The economic structures of society determines the rights given in that society. The ethical valuations of a community, as is implied by the statement, are thus more equitable when our economic structuring, along with the corollary structuring of our culture, evolves.

And since I find Marx's writing (at least in this situation) to be more descriptive than prescriptive, I think he is trying to say that this evolution (supposedly toward socialism) is unavoidable. Our economic structures are bound to develop into something more. We (meaning the developed world) are getting richer and richer, and we're getting more and more connected. I think you can see where I'm going with this...

With this increasing connectivity and our growing ability to "share the wealth" with those whose labor is exploited much more than ours, we will start to do more than just simply bear witness to the very atrocious human exploitation that makes us so rich. Marx's argument to me, describes the motif of growing human sympathy through history, if you are willing to go out on a limb with me and conceive of the materialist dialectic to be not wholly material and maybe more emotional. Our society, in Marx's view, is moving away from turning a blind eye to the wrongs of the current neo-liberal system of business (exploitation) as usual. With the oodles of cash and the internet we now have access to, we can now do something, and the ability to do something will only further the process of actually doing something.

So I guess, in summation, I take the idea of socialism in theory to really mean socialism as theory of history. And to accept the history lessons Marx is feeding us, means that we must also see a future where the distribution of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" (182).

connections between classes

The other day in my Latin American Politics class I got to draw a parallel between that class and this one. In IS we had been discussing the Fujimori regime which ruled Peru during the 1990’s. During his rule he instated a system of state sponsored terrorism to combat the already existing threat which was Sendero Luminoso, a Maoist guerilla movement in Peru. The conflict between civilian officials and the military and Sendero Luminoso resulted in approximately 70,000 deaths in Peru We talked about this idea of the instrumentalization of fear and how in Peru democracy broke down into authoritarianism. The class discussion turned to this idea of times of necessity when democratic principles are suspended. During this time, the majority of Peruvians supported Fujimori’s authoritarian regime because they felt like he was protecting the country. (Later on, Fujimori was brought before international courts and charged with Crimes Against Humanity, among other things, but at the time he enjoyed a lot of support in Peru.) In other words, the citizens of Peru were willing to give up some of their civil liberties in order to let Fujimori have more power and authority to fight Sendero Luminoso. This sounded to me a lot like Kant’s concept, “the right of necessity”. In relating it to the case of Peru, it seems like impeding threat of Sendero Luminoso was more coercive to the Peruvian people, and the Fujimori regime than the possibility of breaking the law. Is this how Kant would look at this situation? Is it true that it is not an issue for justice if the Peruvians saw Sendero Luminoso as such an imminent threat? Or would he say that the Peruvian people are irrational because rational people would not give up their civil rights? Would he say that the thousands of deaths that were carried out by the Fujimori regime were unjust because there is no way to tell the future, and no way that the regime could’ve known how dangerous Sendero Luminoso was, and the consequences that would come of their actions? I mean, we are talking about a regime that killed civilians and children and anyone that they suspected could be associated with Sendero Luminoso. Is this the kind of necessitous situation that Kant was talking about?

marxism and health care

Going back to Marxism and the idea of universal health care that was brought up in class, I agree that health care is a natural need of all people, one that all self-interested persons are together in desiring, but I do not see the step from to a the necessity of providing health care, or any public function, for everyone. This is not only to do with health care, but also with the social security, fire department, and ambulance examples that we discussed in class. From a libertarian perspective, the government's providing of these communal goods is a violation of my personal liberty and goes against my self interest as well. When I earn money, it is in my interest to make a profit so that I can meet the needs I might have in the future. It is not in my immediate interest to make a profit so that I can pay for the needs of others, although it might be in my interest to make sure that others are capable of receiving these goods anyways.
For example, with the case of health care, as a self interested being I want to be able to pay for the services of receiving basic care. As self-interested, I can recognize no obligation to pay for health care unless I want it, and no obligation to pay for the health care of others. While I would still agree that health care is in everyone's best interest then, I don't see how it carries that this best interest requires me to pay for the health of others.
Having a universal health care system in place might even run contrary to my self interest in the long run. Due to the fact that health care is a limited resource, that there are not enough doctors to see every patient when they have an emergency let alone a basic check-up, providing everyone with health care might limit my own ability to receive the type and level of service I desire. Because of the limited resources available though, it could be the case that some individuals will use much more of this resource than I do, effectively taking a larger share of a common commodity although we would be contributing equally.
I know I'm oversimplifying the health care debate in this post- I admit I don't know what the current plan is. I also recognize that providing basic health care for people who need it but are unable to pay for it would cut down the cost of health care, as preventative care early on would decrease the numbers of those left fighting long term diseases that could have been more easily stopped if they had been diagnosed earlier. I guess my main problem is that I don't feel comfortable with the idea that just because all people have an interest in good health means that people have a right to health care, especially if that right to health care is played out by a government providing that care. Maybe my question is more whether health care is a entitlement that should be required from governments that are set up for the purpose of serving the people, even if this requires taking money from citizens who can pay to pay for those who can't, or whether health care is recognizable as a human commonality that all people admittedly share based on the common interest of good health, but that perhaps no single entity is obligated to provide.

On the Pernicious Errors of Marxism

I beg indulgence if my chosen title seems grandiose, but I feel the need to disengage from the typical 'on one hand/on the other hand' detached approach to the systems of thought we have studied in favor of a stronger contention, one that I can scarcely make in explicit enough terms. We have made a distinction in our discussion of Marxism between the theory itself and its practice in recent history (the latter presumably suffering near-universal opprobrium), intending to concern ourselves only with the merits of the former. Very well; on those grounds, I contend Marxism to be a singularly ill-conceived and destructive ideological system. Indeed, the atrocities committed in its name over the past century derive not predominantly from the perversion of its tenets but are instead natural consequences of the attempt to realize them.

I: The Economic Naïveté of Marxism

Marx's analysis of the relationship between labor and capital rests on a number of broad generalizations which are grounded in the context of the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, and which changing economic realities have rendered increasingly simplistic and inaccurate. Marx posits that the capitalist goal of creating surplus value (profit) creates an inevitable trend towards depression of wages and rise in prices. Yet just a few decades later, that great capitalist, Henry Ford, would say, "There is one rule for the industrialist and that is: Make the best quality of goods possible at the lowest cost possible, paying the highest wages possible." Ford, unlike the theoretical Marxist bourgeois, saw an incentive for the capitalist to set higher wages and lower prices, because of two phenomena for which Marx does not adequately account: employee retention and consumer choice.

In Marx's time, the industrial machine of Europe was dependent on waves of migration from the countryside to the cities which created a virtually bottomless pool of unskilled labor willing to work for a pittance. In this context, there was indeed little material incentive to raise wages, since there would virtually always be labor available no matter how low the compensation. But by the time Ford made his pronouncement in a more mature industrial society, the importance of specialization and skilled labor had increased to the point that an industrialist had a strong motive to pay his workers a sum sufficient at least to keep them around. In terms of pricing of goods, it was always the case that a business could realize greater profits by lowering prices to undercut its competitors, and the tendency towards lower prices of industrially produced goods only strengthened as more industrial competition took hold. Multiple means exist for a capitalist to increase profits without oppressing his labor force or bilking his costumers, such as increasing technological efficiency or acquiring cheaper suppliers, and the constant progress of business interests in these fields further serves to lower prices for the consumer.

The broad trend of rising wages and falling prices (and the tremendous economic growth that makes them possible) has raised the standard of living of the average wage-earner in advanced societies tremendously in the decades since Marx wrote, precisely to the contrary of his predictions. The man on the assembly line in modern America lives better than the average bourgeois in Marx's day. The argument that the proletariat is being pressed further and further into misery is difficult to maintain when the average wage-earning family can have two cars, three TVs, and annual vacations to Niagra Falls or Disneyland.

II: The Absurdity of Dialectical Materialism

One would be well-advised to be skeptical of any system that claims to have discovered an all encompassing theory of human history. Hegel's dialectical idealism nonetheless retains the saving grace of pairing the dialectical concept with its proper objects, ideas. Dialectic is a concept originating in classical logic, intended to mediate between opposing truth claims. While Marx's adaption of the dialectical principle to material relations between humans may seem somehow more practical or level-headed than Hegel's loftier conception, the objects of Marx's use of the dialectic method (that is, the entire spectrum of human economic behavior) are entirely unsuited for the logical straitjacket it imposes. Economic activity is the sum of manifold factors from the natural environment to political and cultural constraints to the divergent material interests of types and stations of men and women, which vary far more widely than any simplistic dichotomy such as "bourgeois and proletarian" can capture. But such a dichotomy is necessary to conceive of history in dialectic terms.

For Marx, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed." Marx's sense of history is so blinded by his economic bias that he ignores the gross dissimilarities of the relationships and epochs he has just breezily rattled off. Thus he must do, for close historical analysis (at least analysis unencumbered by Marxist dogma) fails to bear out his attempt to force past societies into the neat categories of oppressor and oppressed that he observed in 19th century Europe. The patrician and plebeian distinctions of ancient Rome were complex social phenomena that did not invariably imply economic superiority of one of the other; there were numerous wealthy plebeians, which eventually led the Roman concept of nobility to evolve. But though economic factors were inextricably linked with this evolution, social and political distinctions remained even economic ones faded.

What Marx does not (and cannot) admit is that the social and political activity, which do indeed operate within the constraints imposed by the material order, are not only affected by the economic order but are able to affect it themselves, independent of the eternal principle of class conflict to which he subscribes. Human history is determined to an extent by class conflict. Human history is also determined by ties of family, tribe, and nation, by religion, by philosophic and scientific curiosity, by a hundred other factors that describe what it is to be human, all of which are able to create changes in the world of their own accord, independent of economic relations, even as they may be subject to economic effects and are in turn capable of determining the terms of economic relations. No aspect of human affairs (even economics) occupies a vacuum.

III: The Marxist Misconception of Human Nature and Society

Much of the attraction to Marxist theory lies in his astute observations of the alienating tendencies of the capitalist system, expressing clearly the sentiments that most have held at one time or another towards the more dehumanizing aspects of wage-based employment. To give credit where credit is due, Marx is an excellent sociologist. He is correct that that capitalism necessarily removes the worker from the product of his labor and from the natural world, produces conditions under which he tends to be placed in competition against his fellow worker, etc. The question then is 'as opposed to what?'

Marx's conception of the alienation of the laborer from the natural world and from the product of one's labor presumably stands in opposition to the precapitalist state, in which the dominant economic activity was that in which the product of one's labor (as in subsistence farming, shoe-making, fishing, tanning, etc.) could be directly enjoyed by oneself and one's neighbors. Yet the state for the average individual in feudal or traditional economies was and is hardly as rosy as this would seem to make out; a peasant farmer merely a bad harvest away from starvation is more concerned with his own survival than with his intimate connection to nature and the product of his labor. Hoeing a field from dawn to dusk, he does not think "How wonderful it is that I enjoy the fruits on my own labor, the most human of activities!"

Labor is merely intelligent exertion which at its most basic level is about survival, and Marx is as guilty of labor fetishism as capitalists are allegedly guilty of commodity fetishism. It is all very clever to say that under a capitalist system, one finds one's humanity in activities common with beasts (eating, procreation, etc.) rather than the uniquely human activity of labor. But this too is another false dichotomy, neglecting such uniquely human phenomena such as contemplation and companionship that add meaning to our existence and need not bear any relation to creative endeavour. Bluntly, most people do not like to work, and any distinction in this regard between capitalist societies and pre-capitalist ones (or arguably even a Marxian post-capitalist system) is merely a matter of degree. Labor is a function of scarcity in a world in which our needs are not already fulfilled for us. If man dwelt in some Edenic state of nature in which our immediate needs were met, he might still desire as an intelligent creature to engage in creative labor in the form of art, philosophy, and so on, but such 'labor' would not meet material needs nor (in a world without scarcity of material needs) could its products be bought or sold to meet them, and thus such endeavour would not be economic.

The impulse for survival being the most universal of the species, the poverty-stricken peasant in our example would gladly give up his direct connection with the product of his labor in favor of a more secure existence by means of selling his labor. The capitalist system of production creates sufficient wealth to remove more persons from the edge of starvation than traditional non-profit driven economies can manage. This is the case because capitalism requires not just profit, but, as a consequence, the reinvestment of profit to expand operations and thereby allow for a greater profit. This is the basic principle behind continuous economic growth, a phenomenon often taken for granted in modern times but not at all intuitive through much of human history; such growth enables societal wealth to surpass population growth and improve the standard of living for all.

According to Marx, however, capitalism progresses not only towards alienation of labor but towards greater and greater monopolism in which power and wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few at the expense of the many. Here Marx confuses tendencies with inevitabilities; since he views all social and political phenomena as conditioned by economic relations, for him these tendencies of monopolization and alienation must progress unchecked until the system becomes untenable and a revolution results. Yet the history of capitalist societies shows that this has not been the case, precisely because the chief characteristics of the capitalist means of production (unfettered competition and pursuit of profit) are not the only organizing principles of capitalist societies. Marx is correct that capitalism tends to create monopolies; what he fails to note is that other people are equally capable of figuring this out and acting to limit the excesses of the system, thereby preserving it. This is precisely why antitrust laws exist in all advanced economies to check the system's natural impulses which would destroy its chief advantage, namely the system of competition which rewards efficiency.

The means of production are exactly that, a means, and do not operate of their own accord according to some esoteric historical principle. Social and political factors are capable of effecting changes contrary to the intrinsic trends of the economic system, as one can clearly see in the rise of the modern welfare state, which burdens capitalism with minimum wages, workplace regulations, social safety nets, etc. Even if one takes the cynical view that such accommodations are entirely due to the desire of a ruling elite to maintain the existing economic and political framework, this practical modification of capitalism against its own worst tendencies totally contradicts the Marxist view of the inevitable descent of the capitalist system into its own destruction, as mentioned previously. Marx is incapable of granting human beings the capacity to see beyond the parameters of their economic relationships to rationally critique and change them contrary to his laws of history.

The same principle applies in Marx's view of the alienation of labor. For him, because modern society is dependent on the capitalist means of production and because capitalism is dependent on pure profit, capitalist societies are rendered devoid of any relationship but "naked self-interest". This view effectively strips mankind of any humanity except in the circumstances of his labor and fails to account for the many impulses which drive human behavior. It is true that it is in the interest of the factory owner to keep wages down for his own profit; but in reality one may do so while the other decides to pay a decent wage merely out his own benevolent impulses. It is true that competition for employment tends to set workers against each other; but in reality two co-workers may find their own friendship more important than attempting to outdo one another in currying favor, or they may join a labor union to safeguard their interests collectively. The most base materialistic principles underlying the capitalist system are key to understanding it, but they are not the only forces at work in the world. Real human beings are too complex to be reduced to dialectical wind-up dolls.

IV: The Necessity of Private Property

For Marx the alienative tendencies of capitalism result from the institution of private property, which he deems unnatural beyond the ownership of basic personal possessions. In some idealized natural state is indeed conceivable that private property as modernly conceived would not exist. Yet the concept inevitably emerged in some form as human society settled and grew in sophistication. Marx would acknowledge this much, marking the emergence from primitive communism into a slave-based system in part by the institutions of private property. However, Marx also claims that the institution will be destroyed in favor of a society in which all are freely provided with their needs by all others. The question is whether such a society could exist and whether we would want to live in it if it did.

At any significant level of societal size and advancement, private property is an absolute prerequisite for personal freedom. In the reverse formulation, a society of any size without the institution of private property cannot be free. This truth is dependent upon two observable facts: the scarcity of material resources and the imperfection of human nature.

The capacity of humans to desire is unlimited; the capacity of the natural world and our fellow man to fulfill our desires is limited. Consequently a regulative economic principle must determine the method by which goods and services are distributed, which presently is primarily monetary exchange. Under a theoretical Marxist system, all products of labor would held communally and distributed to each individual according to need (Marx is remarkably vague on this point but I take him at his word). On a large scale it is impossible that such a system could be administered by anything other than a centralized authority, since it is beyond the knowledge of the individual what the needs of numerous other unknown individuals are; a civilization with a completely decentralized economic system lacking a medium of exchange would quickly sink into economic chaos.

Imagine a factory producing furniture in Marxist Never-Never Land, operated by a council of workers. The factory receives raw timber from lumberjacks according to its need and subsequently doles out chaise-lounges to the citizenry according to their respective needs. This factory is particularly good at what it does, and consequently all the locals desire to receive the finely made furniture from this manufactory as opposed to others like it. Lacking the production capacity to satisfy all comers, the workers council must make determinations of the various levels of need of those who desire access to its product. But they cannot possibly do this accurately for every person who walks by and asks for a lawn chair. Furthermore they will have a hard time negotiating with their lumberjack suppliers for greater timber supplies since they themselves can never be sure of the level of need for their product across an entire society. Consequently, one of two things must occur: either a centralized system of determining and filling the needs of each individual must be instituted, or some additional incentive must be offered to the producers to grant products to individual consumers, in the form of a medium of exchange. If the latter, then private property has in effect been instituted, as it is now up to the factory workers to alienate their products as they see fit.

But if it is the former, and the system must  be centrally administered, the next obstacle to a free, propertyless society becomes human nature. Even in a society in which all needs are guaranteed, it will be the case that some will desire more than they need. Consequently the basis for self-interested action remains, and even if all the customers to the furniture factory have a set number of ration points, one might still score an extra Barca lounge by sleeping with the foreman, etc. Consequently the distribution system must be not only centralized but coercive. Anyone who thinks that at some point human nature may be entirely stripped of any self-interested impulses whatsoever need read no further. But the sane remainder must recognize that in a system in which all economic relations are devoted to the principle of "each according to his need", all productive activity must be coercively regulated. All the goods and services one receives must become subject to a remote bureaucratic tyranny in order to preserve the integrity of the system. Meaningful liberty can hardly be preserved in such a predicament. What you get instead is strikingly similar to the Soviet Union.

Some will object that I am giving short-shrift to the ability of humanity to put aside its self-interested impulses (presumably warped and exaggerated by the depredations of the capitalist system). I respond that a system with a governing principle self-interested exchange does not rule out individual charity towards fellow men. Charity, that is, selfless love or benevolence, cannot by definition become a governing principle itself, except in the mind and will of the individual, since charity is to freely go beyond what one owes as a matter of strict justice. I can only freely give that which belongs to me by right. Under capitalism, benevolent impulses and behavior ameliorates the baser tendencies towards narrow-self interest. Under a truly communist system, benevolence (at least in the material sphere) does not exist. Such is the society Marx deems inevitable; if he were not so clearly mistaken one would be forced to tremble.