Thursday, September 24, 2009

Problems with "Natural Justice"

Hume presented presents a system of justice based largely on observations of rational human nature. It involves a pseudo virtue that only exists within a society gripped with scarcity. As the solution to a societal problem, justice seemed seems to be more of an accepted tradition rather than an institution based on rational deduction. What evolves to be a good actionHume defines a “good” action to be is one which most people would praise, praise- independent of self-love or egoism. The concepts of Rright and wrong evoke feelings derived from moral sentiment. Those who would diverge from this innate moral sentiment would be labeled solipsists and unable to contribute to the notion of justice. Initially people buy into justice out of a self-interest for self-preservation. However, Tthey continue to promote those accepted traditions bydue to a sense of self-sympathy or the feeling of approval towards a “good” action.

Could the same ideas characterize our Honor Code? The Honor Code provides that members of the Rhodes College Community do not lie, cheat, or steal. Most would agree concur that agreeing to not engage in those activities clearly justifies not having to worry about being the victim of those actions. While there is an apparent self-interest in being able to leave your laptop in the Rat, do we still subscribe to the Code because of a feeling of self-sympathy? Do students genuinely feel a sentiment of approval when they observe a conscious decision not to lie, cheat, or steal? I would advocate that it is still a more self-interested approach. The College and many students up front would applaud a community that has agreed to abandon these actions but most of that comes from the assurance, or belief in an assurance, that your fellows will not lie to, cheat, or steal to or from you- not a feeling of approval when others choose not to engage in those actions.

The problem I have with much of Hume’s arguments stems from the fact he his claims that it is impossible to divorce sentiments from justice. If a suit is filed against another person, I would consider it just, and necessary, for the judge to make an impartial decision completely independent from feelings or sentiments. A murderer who is single with no family versus a murderer who is a single parent should receive the same punishment for their action despite the fact that I feel more sympathy towards the single-parent. While I believe this would be a just action by the judge, could Hume say the same?

Another example comes from a prominent Alabama businessman from Alabama whom I grew up hearing people around me continually deride. Last summer I worked at a facility he used to own and where he tried to force all of the employees to purchase toxic stocks which soonthat plummeted. According to Hume, human beings should feel an innate sentiment of approval to his conviction; however, most generally disapproved of the penalty handed down. Despite the fact that it was a comparable penalty to others who had committed similar white-collar crimes, it would be classified as unjust under this system. People wanted a harsher sentence simply because they disapproved. While everyone may have had the same sentiment of disapproval for the action, deeming it unjust, the sentiments over the sentence, or the action of the judge, are so varied that it is impossible to define it as one or the other.

3 comments:

  1. I too think it is difficult to reconcile justice and sentiment. The law should be entirely objective. "Feelings" are not necessary to achieving justice. The illegal act should be punished. It is too dangerous to evaluate the individual's motivations for committing the crime.

    Feelings have no place in the justice system. Lady Justice is blindfolded for a reason.

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  2. One of the reasons I like Hume's philosophy is because it does differ from the way we are typically taught to think about justice. I feel like justice is usually seen as a black and white issue that doesn't have anything to do with personal feelings. However, it is clear that judgments have to be made, and laws have to come from somewhere. Hume says that "moral judgments are formed (not by reason) but by sentiment of sympathy." I agree with a lot of Hume's ideas, but I understand that it makes people uneasy to think of justice as subject to people's feelings, and would rather have justice be objective and unchanging. But it just seems like that isn't possible. Because as Hume would ask, where does justice occur in nature? It doesn't. It is a matter of fact that has our own personal moral judgment put onto it.

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  3. While I'm not particularly inclined to Hume's way of thinking, I suspect that his notion of moral sentiment is somewhat broader than the more effusively emotional connotation that seems to be presumed here. Sentiment simply means feeling as opposed to rational argument, and may include not only simple emotional responses to a particular action (such as anger or pleasure) but a deeper moral intuition. After all, the concept of praise or blame implies that not only do one likes or dislikes a particular action, but that the author of the action is culpable for it, which hardly a simple function of untutored emotion. This line of thought seems to square with the conservative political philosophy of Burke, who extolled the value of "prejudice" in social instiutions, which is to say reactions dependent on convention rather than rational examination of each particular case. Excessive rationalization of all questions involving human behaivor (of which justice is one)can reach a certain arrogance removed from actual experience.

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