A Manufactured Justice

In his treatise, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume argues that natural justice arises from cultural norms. A set of customs slowly develops over time and transforms into what he calls “natural justice.” I find this view problematic. A system of laws that arises out of custom are difficult to identify. How do we recognize these customs? What are the requirements for a custom? Who decides when a custom is institutionalized? How many individuals must agree on a custom before it is a cultural norm (and therefore a part of natural justice)? Can these customs change?

The inherent ambiguities with Hume’s “cultural norms” argument makes it difficult to identify exactly what “natural justice” is.

If natural justice arises from cultural norms, then it must follow that natural justice is relative. The cultural norms of one society can be entirely different from the norms of another. One act (such as cannibalism) may be strictly proscribed in one society, but encouraged in another. The act may be deemed “just” in one place, but entirely unjust in another.

If justice is indeed relative, it appears that Hume would agree that there is not one set of moral standards that are universal and everlasting (such as the idea that murder is bad). There is no “moral code” to guide conduct. The justness (I think that’s a word) or unjustness of an action is entirely dependent on the society in which it takes place.

But isn’t that just the opposite of natural justice?

Natural justice, as Aquinas and Vitoria understood it, is a higher law that transcends human beings and their social rules. It is a set of everlasting laws that humans are bound to follow. Therefore, society cannot create natural justice through their cultural customs. Instead, natural justice should be a guide for societal justice. We should model our rules and definition of justice around universal and unchanging laws (laws that apply everywhere and do not change). That is what is truly just.

The origin of this natural law is irrelevant (whether the laws are given by God or whether they are inherent in nature does not matter). Either way, the law is immutable and eternal. Those are the primary characteristics of natural law.

Here’s another way to look at it: justice isn’t whatever we say it is (through our cultural norms). It is a guide for our conduct that helps to distinguish between right and wrong. I have no doubt that Hume was aware of this. He probably would respond by disagreeing with the idea of a “universal morality.” If I am right in anticipating his response, then there is nothing “natural” about Hume’s definition of justice. His “natural justice” is not inherent in nature nor is it unchanging. Instead, it, as I understand it, relies on a utilitarian principle. Natural justice is what the majority of people say that it is. The survival of cultural norms indicates that they are widely agreed upon and, therefore, just.

The actions of the majority are not necessarily just. In fact, the actions of the majority tend to be made at the expense of weaker minorities. Slavery in the mid-19^th century, for example, oppressed tens of thousands of blacks. One would be hard pressed to find someone deem that “just” simply because the majority deemed it useful and agreeable to the majority. Although one might argue that slavery was unjust and that is why the slaves were emancipated, that would still require that slavery be at some point in time deemed just.

Like I said before, justice isn’t whatever we say it is. Hume’s “natural justice” is inaptly named. Instead, appears more like a manufactured justice.