I have found it very interesting to see how each new philosopher we encounter initially broaches the topic of justice. Of course there have been Plato’s rhetorical games with Thrasymachus, Aristotle’s supreme analogy, Hume’s thoughts on fellowship, and then well things like the musings of Kant. And as we have discussed before, while each has its own merits, some of these approaches seem to be more easily applied to daily life than others.
Especially evident in Mill’s encapsulation of justice, there is a certain intrinsic practicality that comes with utilitarianism because Mill seeks to reconcile the differences that arise between ‘objective reality’ and the subjective feelings which are inspired by it. And within this framework, our sense of justice is spoken of as a natural or instinctive phenomenon, driven by nature itself.
I believe this is an important distinction to make because it implies that divorcing our feelings from our sense of justice can never be satisfactorily achieved because one begets the other. Taking this idea into account when addressing something like the permutations of the trolley problem, adds yet another level of complexity to our seemingly simple moral dilemma. From our classroom, far removed from any tracks, bridges, or devices by which we are supposed to carry out this catch 22 scenario our concrete detachment gives us the ability to ponder each outcome, using logic, emotions, humor, or any other such devices we might choose.
However, if you could place yourself in the dead of a cold night, along a set of dark deserted railroad tracks in the presence of the trolley terrorists, I wonder what exactly would truly drive each of us to perform one action over the other. In other words, with time being of mortal consequence and with your hand clutching the cold metal lever of destiny, what would be running through your mind? Mill would of course argue that the best outcome would be that which saved the five individuals bound to the tracks, regardless of their felonious or non-felonious character. However, even if we choose this as the greatest good, the perception of this reality and the feelings associated with this outcome must be of equal consequence.
This is in fact a question that Mills uses to initially frame his conceptualization of justice when he states, “Is the justice or injustice of an action a thing intrinsically peculiar” or is justice “Only a combination of certain of those qualities presented under peculiar aspect.” This is certainly an interesting question because it would seem that the answer would betray how effective our studious conditioning would be in guaranteeing that the ‘correct’ choice is made when our hand is clutching the lever.
Sunday, September 27, 2009
Hume, I think I like you
I have been out with the flu this past week so sadly I was unable to take part in the class discussions. However, after reading some of these blog posts I think I have a good idea of what was discussed in class. I think that something which interested me were Hume’s three rules. First, that moral sentiments are found in all men. I would have to agree with this. I mean I do not believe that there are people out there who are entirely evil, and are on earth to cause nothing but destruction. Even those who have committed terrible crimes must have some virtues, or have done some nice things in their lives. Second, that people praise and blame the same actions. I think this is completely true. An argument can be made for basically anything, and I feel that while most would blame one act there would be those out there who could make a logical argument for why it should be praised. Even something as terrible as murder, I will bet anyone that there would be an intelligent person out there who could make an argument for why it was not a bad thing. Maybe not good, but surly not bad. And then there are the little acts that occur in everyday life, such as someone holding the door for someone else. While most people would think such an action is kind and selfless, I know that there are others who would not praise this. They would argue that at the root of the action is personal gain and such an act should not receive credit. Also, the act of cheating: I have heard countless times the cheating is wrong and no one should ever do it. However I have also been told that if you are not cheating, you're not trying. Heck I think that is the motto of the New England Patriots. But back to the topic at hand, these are just several scenarios supporting rule number two. Rule number three, which states that praise and blame are not derived from self love. This last rule I feel is difficult to tackle because I am not sure I completely understand it. However, from what I see praise and blame are rational ideas and should not derived from self love. They should come from morals and ideas of the mind, not the heart.
I like these rules, and think that I relate with Hume more than any of the others we have read from thus far. He seems to have an open mind, and that human acts should be put into context and can be looked at from several different viewpoints. I also think that one can never really know the reasons behind another’s actions. It is impossible, you can't get inside their head and know their thought process nor can you know their past well enough to fully understand what has led them to where they are. Everything is up for argument and interpretation. I think Hume more than the others has fallen somewhere on this idea.
I like these rules, and think that I relate with Hume more than any of the others we have read from thus far. He seems to have an open mind, and that human acts should be put into context and can be looked at from several different viewpoints. I also think that one can never really know the reasons behind another’s actions. It is impossible, you can't get inside their head and know their thought process nor can you know their past well enough to fully understand what has led them to where they are. Everything is up for argument and interpretation. I think Hume more than the others has fallen somewhere on this idea.
I'm Unjust. Sorry.
So I was just reading Walter's post about his appreciation for his major and the awesome ways that philosophy can affect our lives. I totally agree with this, except for with regards to the subject of our class. Here's the thing: I am an atheist, and I firmly believe that one day everyone will die and, afterwards, nothing we have ever done will matter. A man wiser than myself once said, "All we are is dust in the wind." While each of the readings help me to understand the importance of justice or its origins, they never compel me to act differently that I would have before those readings.
I can totally identify with Hume's explanation of the origin of justice, and I agree with (almost) everything that Mill says. The fact of the matter is that I don't care to make efforts to become a just person. I am one of the people Dr. Johnson was describing when she mentioned how people in our society make decisions based on utilitarian concepts, except for one minor detail. That idea would have me make choices which maximize pleasure for the most and minimize pain for the most. Instead, I pretty much always act in ways which maximize pain for me and minimize pain for me. Anytime I do typical "nice" things (hold the door for someone, etc), I can pretty much say I only do those things to benefit myself. I'm holding that door because I hope it'll make that cute girl smile at me.
So yeah. Basically, I enjoy these readings/discussions quite a bit, but in the end they just serve to make me feel like I'm somehow more selfish and meaner than the rest of you.
I can totally identify with Hume's explanation of the origin of justice, and I agree with (almost) everything that Mill says. The fact of the matter is that I don't care to make efforts to become a just person. I am one of the people Dr. Johnson was describing when she mentioned how people in our society make decisions based on utilitarian concepts, except for one minor detail. That idea would have me make choices which maximize pleasure for the most and minimize pain for the most. Instead, I pretty much always act in ways which maximize pain for me and minimize pain for me. Anytime I do typical "nice" things (hold the door for someone, etc), I can pretty much say I only do those things to benefit myself. I'm holding that door because I hope it'll make that cute girl smile at me.
So yeah. Basically, I enjoy these readings/discussions quite a bit, but in the end they just serve to make me feel like I'm somehow more selfish and meaner than the rest of you.
Utilitarianism in the context of the Categorical Imperative
After reading and discussing Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Mill’s Utilitarianism, a fusion of the two philosophies seems to be the idea closest to what I believe is justice. As stated in class, we are all in some respects Utilitarian. In the trolley example, all of us agreed that we would, or at least should, throw the switch. Seeing others suffer is painful to the majority of humans, and we would agree with the greatest happiness principle. Yet in order to reach this principle, we must, at times, treat others as means. This would go against what most of us think of as justice, for it violates the Categorical Imperative. We must accept this violation to live and govern justly, but we must also keep the Categorical Imperative in mind when making our decisions.
In execution we must adhere to Utilitarianism, but in principle we must strive to govern our actions by the Categorical Imperative. To be just we should limit our use of Utilitarianism through checks with the Categorical Imperative. A good example of this type of action or governing is the use of war. It can be justifiably used as a means to protect a great number of people through the sacrifice of a few. The few are treated as means, so it does violate the Categorical Imperative A country with a volunteer army obviously has the easiest job justifying the use of war, but with the incorporation of a draft makes the use of war more questionable.
Another example of justice as a mix between Kant and Mill’s philosophies is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If viewed directly with the Categorical Imperative in mind, then this action cannot be seen as just. Leveling cities with thousands of civilians in order to win a war cannot be seen as a universal law, and it also treats humans as means rather than ends. The decision was a very Utilitarian, for it was made in order to save lives of Americans and Japanese. There is not much of an argument against the fact that it saved lives, for it was a mere estimate that 1-2 million American soldiers would die upon invasion, which does not even account for the numbers of Japanese who would perish.
The justice of this decision depends on how much one holds the Categorical Imperative to be a governing principle. The action in itself cannot be said to be just, for it is not a universal law and it uses humans as a means. Yet, there is no way to predict the future. One can only judge what is right and wrong on the basis of a rational account, and there was reason to believe that this action would end the war a bring about less casualties. This decision adhered to the greatest happiness principle but violated the Categorical Imperative.
In execution we must adhere to Utilitarianism, but in principle we must strive to govern our actions by the Categorical Imperative. To be just we should limit our use of Utilitarianism through checks with the Categorical Imperative. A good example of this type of action or governing is the use of war. It can be justifiably used as a means to protect a great number of people through the sacrifice of a few. The few are treated as means, so it does violate the Categorical Imperative A country with a volunteer army obviously has the easiest job justifying the use of war, but with the incorporation of a draft makes the use of war more questionable.
Another example of justice as a mix between Kant and Mill’s philosophies is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If viewed directly with the Categorical Imperative in mind, then this action cannot be seen as just. Leveling cities with thousands of civilians in order to win a war cannot be seen as a universal law, and it also treats humans as means rather than ends. The decision was a very Utilitarian, for it was made in order to save lives of Americans and Japanese. There is not much of an argument against the fact that it saved lives, for it was a mere estimate that 1-2 million American soldiers would die upon invasion, which does not even account for the numbers of Japanese who would perish.
The justice of this decision depends on how much one holds the Categorical Imperative to be a governing principle. The action in itself cannot be said to be just, for it is not a universal law and it uses humans as a means. Yet, there is no way to predict the future. One can only judge what is right and wrong on the basis of a rational account, and there was reason to believe that this action would end the war a bring about less casualties. This decision adhered to the greatest happiness principle but violated the Categorical Imperative.
Impartiality and Rationality are the Keys
I think that Lindsey’s challenge is directed toward a very valid point.I believe that in order to fully accept or reject the argument of Jon Stuart Mill, one must have a firm grasp of their view on equality amongst human beings.Here lies the greatest obstacle we face in making a decision for the “trolley example.” In the multiple instances that I have discussed this situation, the first reaction is to ask who the individuals on the trolley are.Do they have families?Are they criminals?Are they a member of my family?
I am not clear on Mill’s view of equality, whether it only refers to equal liberty and rights or equality in value of human beings.I myself am referring to equality in the sense of skills and abilities amongst human beings.I believe that certain individuals are more important to society and are able to contribute on a greater level than others.While I know that many might disagree with me, this belief that I hold is important to my view for the trolley example.While I would pull the lever to kill the one person if I had absolutely no knowledge of who the individuals were, I certainly would have a different thought process if I was aware of who the victims were.If the single individual was a world class researcher from St. Jude’s and the five were factory workers with loving families, I believe the correct action would be to save the researcher because I believe he is more valuable to humanity.While this may stir outcry, I still believe that certain individuals are “worth” more, per say, so that order amongst humanity and progress may be maintained.
We generally praise examples of this as a society.In Air Force One, no one frets when a man takes a bullet for the president.While a situation such as that has not occurred to the public’s direct knowledge, there are still individuals who are supposed to protect the president at the cost of their own life, if necessary.
We have spoken a great deal of emotional losses and the effects they would have upon a trolley decision, and I believe that emotions should be completely taken out of the equation.Emotions are irrational, and founded in connections that we as humans have created.One might argue that we should protect one who has loved ones back at home, but really I believe we should be more rational and examine larger picture.Perhaps I am being cynical, but I truly see emotions as impeding our ability to make rational and impartial decisions.
I am not clear on Mill’s view of equality, whether it only refers to equal liberty and rights or equality in value of human beings.I myself am referring to equality in the sense of skills and abilities amongst human beings.I believe that certain individuals are more important to society and are able to contribute on a greater level than others.While I know that many might disagree with me, this belief that I hold is important to my view for the trolley example.While I would pull the lever to kill the one person if I had absolutely no knowledge of who the individuals were, I certainly would have a different thought process if I was aware of who the victims were.If the single individual was a world class researcher from St. Jude’s and the five were factory workers with loving families, I believe the correct action would be to save the researcher because I believe he is more valuable to humanity.While this may stir outcry, I still believe that certain individuals are “worth” more, per say, so that order amongst humanity and progress may be maintained.
We generally praise examples of this as a society.In Air Force One, no one frets when a man takes a bullet for the president.While a situation such as that has not occurred to the public’s direct knowledge, there are still individuals who are supposed to protect the president at the cost of their own life, if necessary.
We have spoken a great deal of emotional losses and the effects they would have upon a trolley decision, and I believe that emotions should be completely taken out of the equation.Emotions are irrational, and founded in connections that we as humans have created.One might argue that we should protect one who has loved ones back at home, but really I believe we should be more rational and examine larger picture.Perhaps I am being cynical, but I truly see emotions as impeding our ability to make rational and impartial decisions.
What an Idealist
As a religious studies major, I find myself reading many texts that are liberation theologies and demand that certain justice and equity be extended to all humans. That said, when I come into contact with these philosophies I end up reading them with strange joy (for every reading, mostly) at seeing the same principles of hope and reciprocity laid out in these mini treaties, with variations, of course. But each call for some form of justice much clearer, I would suggest, than what we see today. That is, of course, because many set up ideal societies (like Plato) and they worked only because that philosopher made them work. All of this is relevant, I promise, because I saw this same situation working in David Hume, though I sense something very real and workable about his philosophy.
In Hume's ideal society, he does not rely on the mos intelligent or Wise individuals to become rules as did Plato, but instead chose to hold individuals accountable for establishing justice. His ideal society is set up only to contrast our real society, I believe, and to illustrate, perhaps, how we might look if we can work to achieve his goals. "The mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his feels" (Hume, 134). Justice is needed because we mess things up by worrying so much about our own personal interests and forget about the rest of humanity. Frederick Lassalle's ideal fourth class and the Jewish bourgeoisie of Imperial Germany embody the notion that if we care about neighbor and the "other" as much as we care about "self" we shall see improvement and, in time, have no further need for justice. What a concept (note sarcasm). I realize this is an Idealist notion, but is that not part of the purpose of these readings; to understand justice and to mobilize ourselves in this place and time to create change? Sure, we find ourselves in modern shipwrecks on a daily basis and ask ourselves, "Do I help my neighbor reach shore or do I, the more fit and deserving, make it myself and have more of the island's resources for myself," for example. When we study for an exam with friends or classmates, we always have a secret hope that we understand concepts better, will answer more elegantly, and set the curve for exams. We look upon our friend as "other," in many ways, and hope to excel beyond them. This bothers me so very much and I can scarcely explain why. Must be consistently be the best? The Guardians of our respective worlds, as Plato would have it? Or is it possible that we can embrace this small portion of Hume's work that he surely did not intend to be used in such a way so that "The whole human race would form only one family; where all would lie in common, and be used freely, without regard to property" (135)? It isn't fully possible, I understand, to be so benevolent that we no longer need justice, but why do we refuse to at least try?
Since my perfect world cannot exist and justice must be considered, how do we become fully just, developed individuals? Hume has a really delightful statement that I believe holds much truth, nothing that "the more we vary our views of human life, the newer and more unusual the lights are in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced, that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory" (138). This resonates with with the sympathetic strings when one is playing a string instrument. When one string vibrates, the vibrations cause others strings to also vibrate and justice becomes clearer as a result of this resonance. When we understand others and their positions and lots in life, we can more appropriately apply justice to their lives. Sally McFague, in Life Abundant, talks about a concept of "Wild Space," the places in our lives that don't fit nicely with those of everyone else's. They act as a window that can open our eyes and consciousness to other lifestyles, beliefs, and experiences. For each experience we have that gives us more insight (for example, being black, lesbian, disabled, gay, diseased, dying, or losing a child), we are able to better understand humanity as a whole, but especially individuals (McFague, 48). Perhaps this is the call that I make using this bit of Hume's writing: that we all seek to open ourselves to be resonators of the difficulties and oppressions of others and that we exact justice for those individuals that cannot speak for themselves or even see that injustices are being done to them.
When do we stop being descendants of the superior civilized Europeans that believe that we can take whatever we covet? It should not be the case that "whatever we covet they must instantly resign; Our permission [must not be] the only tenure by which they hold their possessions" (Hume, 138). What we must do, however, is allow our kindness and our understanding to be the first checkpoints for whether justice is being served or not. We must quit seeing ourselves as individuals and work together as a whole to lift those around us instead of seeking personal glory or property. "Boundaries of Justice wstill grow larger in proportion to the largeness of men's views and teh force of their mutual connections. Histoyr, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of huan sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become aquanted with the extensive utility of that virtue" (Hume, 140).
So, in my quest to apply these philosophies to my own life, today and each day after, I will seek to feel at least a little of what others feel. To wait for the slowest, for sooner or later we will all catch up with the fastest. I will promise to feel at least a little of the pain I have caused my enemies and to understand, in return, why our perspectives have differed. To feel oppression saves us from being oppressors and giving when we have abundance will, I hope, ensure that we have providers when the world has given us cold misfortunes.
Let us be strings that are willing to resonate sympathetically.
In Hume's ideal society, he does not rely on the mos intelligent or Wise individuals to become rules as did Plato, but instead chose to hold individuals accountable for establishing justice. His ideal society is set up only to contrast our real society, I believe, and to illustrate, perhaps, how we might look if we can work to achieve his goals. "The mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his feels" (Hume, 134). Justice is needed because we mess things up by worrying so much about our own personal interests and forget about the rest of humanity. Frederick Lassalle's ideal fourth class and the Jewish bourgeoisie of Imperial Germany embody the notion that if we care about neighbor and the "other" as much as we care about "self" we shall see improvement and, in time, have no further need for justice. What a concept (note sarcasm). I realize this is an Idealist notion, but is that not part of the purpose of these readings; to understand justice and to mobilize ourselves in this place and time to create change? Sure, we find ourselves in modern shipwrecks on a daily basis and ask ourselves, "Do I help my neighbor reach shore or do I, the more fit and deserving, make it myself and have more of the island's resources for myself," for example. When we study for an exam with friends or classmates, we always have a secret hope that we understand concepts better, will answer more elegantly, and set the curve for exams. We look upon our friend as "other," in many ways, and hope to excel beyond them. This bothers me so very much and I can scarcely explain why. Must be consistently be the best? The Guardians of our respective worlds, as Plato would have it? Or is it possible that we can embrace this small portion of Hume's work that he surely did not intend to be used in such a way so that "The whole human race would form only one family; where all would lie in common, and be used freely, without regard to property" (135)? It isn't fully possible, I understand, to be so benevolent that we no longer need justice, but why do we refuse to at least try?
Since my perfect world cannot exist and justice must be considered, how do we become fully just, developed individuals? Hume has a really delightful statement that I believe holds much truth, nothing that "the more we vary our views of human life, the newer and more unusual the lights are in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced, that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory" (138). This resonates with with the sympathetic strings when one is playing a string instrument. When one string vibrates, the vibrations cause others strings to also vibrate and justice becomes clearer as a result of this resonance. When we understand others and their positions and lots in life, we can more appropriately apply justice to their lives. Sally McFague, in Life Abundant, talks about a concept of "Wild Space," the places in our lives that don't fit nicely with those of everyone else's. They act as a window that can open our eyes and consciousness to other lifestyles, beliefs, and experiences. For each experience we have that gives us more insight (for example, being black, lesbian, disabled, gay, diseased, dying, or losing a child), we are able to better understand humanity as a whole, but especially individuals (McFague, 48). Perhaps this is the call that I make using this bit of Hume's writing: that we all seek to open ourselves to be resonators of the difficulties and oppressions of others and that we exact justice for those individuals that cannot speak for themselves or even see that injustices are being done to them.
When do we stop being descendants of the superior civilized Europeans that believe that we can take whatever we covet? It should not be the case that "whatever we covet they must instantly resign; Our permission [must not be] the only tenure by which they hold their possessions" (Hume, 138). What we must do, however, is allow our kindness and our understanding to be the first checkpoints for whether justice is being served or not. We must quit seeing ourselves as individuals and work together as a whole to lift those around us instead of seeking personal glory or property. "Boundaries of Justice wstill grow larger in proportion to the largeness of men's views and teh force of their mutual connections. Histoyr, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of huan sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become aquanted with the extensive utility of that virtue" (Hume, 140).
So, in my quest to apply these philosophies to my own life, today and each day after, I will seek to feel at least a little of what others feel. To wait for the slowest, for sooner or later we will all catch up with the fastest. I will promise to feel at least a little of the pain I have caused my enemies and to understand, in return, why our perspectives have differed. To feel oppression saves us from being oppressors and giving when we have abundance will, I hope, ensure that we have providers when the world has given us cold misfortunes.
Let us be strings that are willing to resonate sympathetically.
Mill and Hume
When we talked about Mill and the trolley problem in class on Friday, I just kept thinking back to Hume's ethical philosophy, and how I like, but also have problems with, both. I like Hume's idea that justice is never a matter of fact, that it does not exist in nature, and agree that justice could have begun as a matter of fact, but then had something added onto it, which is our own personal judgment. He also states that moral judgments are formed (not by reason) but by the sentiment of sympathy. And I agree with that. And I even agreed with his examples of a perfect society and a society in chaos when he said that neither of those was somewhere that justice applied. I think my major reservation about Hume lies in the 3 rules he stated to prove his theory. First, that moral sentiments are found in ALL men. Second, that men praise and blame the same actions. And Lastly, that praise and blame are not derived from self-love. My greatest problem is in #2, and I just wonder how Hume would justify that. Is he saying that because humans are rational beings, they find the same things to be good and bad? I worry that he is giving men too much credit. Hume calls human feeling the most general principal of human nature. And because of that, it just seems ridiculous to think that all men will agree on matters of good and bad. And I think it's easy to say that there are plenty of issues that currently divide our society, and these are issues that men do not praise and blame in the same way. What would Hume say about issues such as the Death Penalty (perhaps you could say that all men put blame on killing, but what about how divided people are over what to do with a man once he has killed someone else?), and abortion? Is Hume's theory too relative, or am I misreading this entirely?
I've been thinking about the trolley problem a lot this weekend, I even brought it up while at a bar with some friends on Friday night. I feel pretty confident in saying that if I were in that situation I would flip the switch and save the 5 people instead of the one. However, I do understand one of the main arguments against that, which was brought up in class. There is something to be said for the mentality of flipping that switch and actively choosing to kill that one person, instead of doing nothing, and allowing the trolley to continue on its intended path and unfortunately kill the 5 people. Perhaps this says something about the indifference that people often attribute to our generation, I don't know. When the trolley problem changed to include the fat man that we could push onto the tracks, it made me even more uneasy. But my biggest question is about how Kant would have looked at this situation. If you could push the fat man onto the track to save those 5 people, what would be the difference between throwing yourself onto the track to save those 5 people?
I've been thinking about the trolley problem a lot this weekend, I even brought it up while at a bar with some friends on Friday night. I feel pretty confident in saying that if I were in that situation I would flip the switch and save the 5 people instead of the one. However, I do understand one of the main arguments against that, which was brought up in class. There is something to be said for the mentality of flipping that switch and actively choosing to kill that one person, instead of doing nothing, and allowing the trolley to continue on its intended path and unfortunately kill the 5 people. Perhaps this says something about the indifference that people often attribute to our generation, I don't know. When the trolley problem changed to include the fat man that we could push onto the tracks, it made me even more uneasy. But my biggest question is about how Kant would have looked at this situation. If you could push the fat man onto the track to save those 5 people, what would be the difference between throwing yourself onto the track to save those 5 people?
Death in the Name of Justice
I understand that many of you might be tired of discussing it, but I feel compelled to revisit the “trolley problem” and look at it from a different point-of-view. The original situation we investigated involved five people tied to a trolley track facing impending death, and we had the option to throw a switch and send the train onto an alternate track which would result in the death of one person. I asked myself, what if, instead being in the precarious position of choosing to “not save” one person or five, I was one of the six people whose lives hung in the balance in this unfortunate hypothetical scenario? How would I want the person at the switch to act in the context of justice?
First, what would our current three philosophers say? Hume says justice is based on the sentiment of moral sympathy, which is a principle of human nature and that, when making moral judgments we assess the usefulness and agreeableness of an action for the good of the whole. However, we do not have a natural inclination to always be just because sometimes it is against our own interests. Mill’s Utilitarianism is in concordance with the first part, i.e. we should act in a way that produces the greatest amount of pleasure for most and the least amount of pain. Kant’s Categorical Imperative states that we should act only in such a way that we can will the maxim of an action as a universal law.
So, as a victim of a train-track-tying terrorist, what would I want my possible savior to do? If I were included in the group of five, which our class agreed should be saved based on the utilitarian principle, I of course would want the person at the switch to save my group. This action seems to be just according to Mill, Hume, and Kant—the greatest amount of people are saved (implying that it creates a greater amount of happiness for more people and that it is more useful and agreeable for everyone involved), and it seems reasonable to will as a universal law saving five lives instead of one when given the choice. And, naturally, I would be happy because I would still be alive.
The real question is, what if I were the lone person tied to the alternate track? Like Hume says, my natural inclination toward justice would be obstructed because it is clearly in my self-interest to want my own life to be spared. But this, assuming that the other five people are intrinsically no better or worse than me and our families and friends would experience comparable amounts of suffering, is clearly unjust according to the principles of our philosophers. Would I, as the only victim out of six who actually dies, be able to recognize and accept my fate as a sacrifice in the name of justice? Would you?
First, what would our current three philosophers say? Hume says justice is based on the sentiment of moral sympathy, which is a principle of human nature and that, when making moral judgments we assess the usefulness and agreeableness of an action for the good of the whole. However, we do not have a natural inclination to always be just because sometimes it is against our own interests. Mill’s Utilitarianism is in concordance with the first part, i.e. we should act in a way that produces the greatest amount of pleasure for most and the least amount of pain. Kant’s Categorical Imperative states that we should act only in such a way that we can will the maxim of an action as a universal law.
So, as a victim of a train-track-tying terrorist, what would I want my possible savior to do? If I were included in the group of five, which our class agreed should be saved based on the utilitarian principle, I of course would want the person at the switch to save my group. This action seems to be just according to Mill, Hume, and Kant—the greatest amount of people are saved (implying that it creates a greater amount of happiness for more people and that it is more useful and agreeable for everyone involved), and it seems reasonable to will as a universal law saving five lives instead of one when given the choice. And, naturally, I would be happy because I would still be alive.
The real question is, what if I were the lone person tied to the alternate track? Like Hume says, my natural inclination toward justice would be obstructed because it is clearly in my self-interest to want my own life to be spared. But this, assuming that the other five people are intrinsically no better or worse than me and our families and friends would experience comparable amounts of suffering, is clearly unjust according to the principles of our philosophers. Would I, as the only victim out of six who actually dies, be able to recognize and accept my fate as a sacrifice in the name of justice? Would you?
Saturday, September 26, 2009
the "future" and kant.
In class on Friday, we talked about the trolly example. This brought to mind one of Kant's points from earlier in the week. Kant had many issues in particular with justices that could not be made into universal laws. The one that this blurb will focus on, is the problem of trying to predict the future. Kant says that we cannot rule justice in any way that attempts us trying to predict the future. The classic illustration of this that was given in class was the example of anne frank hiding from the Nazis. If we lied to the Nazis to protect anne frank, and siad that she ran out the back door, how do we not know that in fact she left her hiding place and began to run in exactly the direction that we indicated.
Now for me this is the same problem with the trolly example or any issue of justice. We simply cannot predict the future, in fact i think most people would agree that many things happen when we least expect them. But back to the trolly. If we do not flip the switch to save the five people for the one person, how is it that we don't know that if we had flipped the switch, it would not in fact derail the train and save everyone on the tracks, (also without injuring anyone on the trolly).The answer as Dr.J pointed out, is that we are constantly attempting predicting the future. Otherwise we would be paralyzed.
Now, I think, at lest for my own part, that when i predict the future it is many times involuntary, EX: i reach for a glass because i think it will still exist when my fingers touch it. But, this brings a question of how far into the "future" is considered the future. Surely everyone would agree that tomorrow is the future. But what about a mintiue from now? I think most people would agree on that as well, but what about 30 seconds? what about 15? 10? 5? 1/2? Surely now you see my point. What is the "future" and in a way is acting in the present simultaneously an act of predicting the future? I think that while if we were to try to live by this statement everyone would agree that we would wind up as Dr.J says "paralyzed in action". But i still think it is an interesting point to address and ponder. So the question is : If we act at all, are we not predicting the future and if yes, and our actions turn out to be correct, are we not disproving Kant's theory of not making judgements based on future predictions.
Utilitarianism for Dummies
Well, as a non-philosophy major who is attempting to stay afloat in this class of seemingly philosophically-gifted people, I am going to try to make sense of utilitarianism because, as I see it, this is something that (and yes, we said this in class) seems to actually apply to everyone's daily lives in today's modern world. In every sense. Whether we realize it or not. Granted, "justice" is supposed to apply to our daily lives as well ; ) ... but utilitarianism moreso than even the categorical imperative seems to be something that people do automatically, whether or not they can quote Kant or Mill.
Here is my reasoning for this. I believe that the categorical imperative is a great idea--and definitely a concrete way to define justice. Just like "treat others the way you want to be treated" and other cliches tend to idealize situations (because there is no way that we always treat others the way we want to be treated...everyone has those days), the categorical imperative states that humans should apply the maxim of their decisions to a universal law in order for it to be just. Therefore, lying to save someone or lying to not hurt someone's feelings is STILL unjust, though in some cases like Anne Frank, not necessarily immoral. (Please, class-- feel free to correct me if I'm wrong... I'm really trying to make sense of this all!) So we all pretty much agreed that while Kant would say that this is unjust, we all would still lie to save Anne Frank.
It is in applying utilitarianism to the Frank situation, however, that I believe utilitarianism comes to play when explaining why I would house her (or be a part of something like the Underground Railroad). Without any particular philosopher’s help, I would probably say, first of all, that I was helping Anne or slaves because I believe it is the just or right thing to do. If I successfully saved them, it would make me feel all warm and fuzzy inside…so YES I did do it to, in some twisted way, appeal to my own happiness as a human being. And if I didn’t help, I’d probably feel like a pretty rotten person for a pretty long while. Correct me if I'm wrong-- but isn't this utilitarianism?
In other daily situations, I believe that we all are utilitarian in that we do what appeals to our "happiness factor," in both small and big ways, or lower and higher pleasures. We hold the door open for the person behind us because of the joy we get when the person smiles and says "thank you" or because we think it is the right/nice thing to do... just like we feel bad when we slam the door in someone's face. If someone doesn't feel bad about doing that, then they are appealing to their own happiness by not paying attention to others and only to their self, and it obviously doesn't affect them in the slightest sense. We eat when we're hungry, help others out when they ask us a favor, volunteer at various places like hospitals (whether that's because we have the urge to help or because we want to boost our resume)... any and all of these situations appeal ultimately to our happiness as a person or we wouldn't do it in the first place.
Unfortunately, I don't really know where I'm going with this. What I do know is that even though we may NOT know the exact consequences of what is to come, we act in a way that we THINK the consequences will turn out well. There are times when people have good intentions and act utilitarially (so not a word... but work with me here!) like say your roommate does your laundry for you and accidentally turns all your white clothes pink. The consequences: not so good, not so happy, not the goal. But the intentions were to act in a utilitarian way, and I think that it's how I live my life and how most people live theirs.
Here is my reasoning for this. I believe that the categorical imperative is a great idea--and definitely a concrete way to define justice. Just like "treat others the way you want to be treated" and other cliches tend to idealize situations (because there is no way that we always treat others the way we want to be treated...everyone has those days), the categorical imperative states that humans should apply the maxim of their decisions to a universal law in order for it to be just. Therefore, lying to save someone or lying to not hurt someone's feelings is STILL unjust, though in some cases like Anne Frank, not necessarily immoral. (Please, class-- feel free to correct me if I'm wrong... I'm really trying to make sense of this all!) So we all pretty much agreed that while Kant would say that this is unjust, we all would still lie to save Anne Frank.
It is in applying utilitarianism to the Frank situation, however, that I believe utilitarianism comes to play when explaining why I would house her (or be a part of something like the Underground Railroad). Without any particular philosopher’s help, I would probably say, first of all, that I was helping Anne or slaves because I believe it is the just or right thing to do. If I successfully saved them, it would make me feel all warm and fuzzy inside…so YES I did do it to, in some twisted way, appeal to my own happiness as a human being. And if I didn’t help, I’d probably feel like a pretty rotten person for a pretty long while. Correct me if I'm wrong-- but isn't this utilitarianism?
In other daily situations, I believe that we all are utilitarian in that we do what appeals to our "happiness factor," in both small and big ways, or lower and higher pleasures. We hold the door open for the person behind us because of the joy we get when the person smiles and says "thank you" or because we think it is the right/nice thing to do... just like we feel bad when we slam the door in someone's face. If someone doesn't feel bad about doing that, then they are appealing to their own happiness by not paying attention to others and only to their self, and it obviously doesn't affect them in the slightest sense. We eat when we're hungry, help others out when they ask us a favor, volunteer at various places like hospitals (whether that's because we have the urge to help or because we want to boost our resume)... any and all of these situations appeal ultimately to our happiness as a person or we wouldn't do it in the first place.
Unfortunately, I don't really know where I'm going with this. What I do know is that even though we may NOT know the exact consequences of what is to come, we act in a way that we THINK the consequences will turn out well. There are times when people have good intentions and act utilitarially (so not a word... but work with me here!) like say your roommate does your laundry for you and accidentally turns all your white clothes pink. The consequences: not so good, not so happy, not the goal. But the intentions were to act in a utilitarian way, and I think that it's how I live my life and how most people live theirs.
Mill's Trolley Example
An issue that I had will Mill came up with the Trolley example, of whether it would be best to save five people or one. The problem I had with this example, and the way it encouraged us to think, was that it made people into numbers, or simply into things. For example, if the situation was that there was on one train track five iPods, and on the other one, it would seem obvious that the person manning the switch would choose to sacrifice the one for the others. Even after training down one iPod, there would five left to take its place, which would all still be useful to the person at the switch. They all have the same function, they all have the same worth, they are all entirely equal.
Just like the iPod, the trolley example encourages us to think of humans as having a similar function, as all having the same worth, and of all being entirely equal. Unlike the iPods though, where this is actually the case, for people I would argue that these are hardly ever exactly true. If the point of Mill’s example is to help our considers of which brings the maximum amount of pleasure, or least amount of pain, for the most, I wonder how accurately this could be measured. In class one conclusion seemed to be that the grief of five persons being killed would be more than if one person were killed, simply based on the numbers.
Why is it assumed though, that sacrificing one person for five is better? Just based on the numbers, five is more than one, and so we lose more if we sacrifice the five. If the five are killed in Mill’s situation though, why is that more of a loss, or a worse situation, than if the one is killed? Unlike the iPod, persons do not have certain functions such that saving five would help us most. Their lives could be argued to not even have a set amount of worth to us- what does it profit us to save five instead of the one? And the only thing making them equal in this situation is that they all have the equal potential to die by train. In Mill’s example, having removed all context that could possibly make this decision relevant to us, does it matter which switch is pulled?
I think our reaction to this situation reflects these issues. When we started discussing the example, there were lots of questions about whether the people were criminals, whether they had families, whether there any other ways to stop the trolley. This all seem the natural response we should have to this example. With a decision like this, we want and need more of a context to decide it in. I think this shows that whatever decision is made in Mill’s empty example that it isn’t really an accurate measure of the pleasure and pain scale, since the lack of context also takes away the reference points by which to judge which decision will bring the most pleasure and pain.
Even if there was context though, I’m not sure I like this example any more. If the context was that each person had a loving family, the look in class is that it would bring more pleasure and less pain to save the five persons on the track instead of the one. Doing so would decrease the potential amount of pain by decreasing the number of persons who feel the pain. I really wonder if it does though, and find it hard to quantify pleasure and pain like this. One person’s pain at losing a loved one to me is not less than the pain of five person’s pain at losing loved ones. I guess in other words I believe that all the suffering in the world can be felt from one death, and that increasing the numbers of dead does not equal an increase of the suffering felt.
Just like the iPod, the trolley example encourages us to think of humans as having a similar function, as all having the same worth, and of all being entirely equal. Unlike the iPods though, where this is actually the case, for people I would argue that these are hardly ever exactly true. If the point of Mill’s example is to help our considers of which brings the maximum amount of pleasure, or least amount of pain, for the most, I wonder how accurately this could be measured. In class one conclusion seemed to be that the grief of five persons being killed would be more than if one person were killed, simply based on the numbers.
Why is it assumed though, that sacrificing one person for five is better? Just based on the numbers, five is more than one, and so we lose more if we sacrifice the five. If the five are killed in Mill’s situation though, why is that more of a loss, or a worse situation, than if the one is killed? Unlike the iPod, persons do not have certain functions such that saving five would help us most. Their lives could be argued to not even have a set amount of worth to us- what does it profit us to save five instead of the one? And the only thing making them equal in this situation is that they all have the equal potential to die by train. In Mill’s example, having removed all context that could possibly make this decision relevant to us, does it matter which switch is pulled?
I think our reaction to this situation reflects these issues. When we started discussing the example, there were lots of questions about whether the people were criminals, whether they had families, whether there any other ways to stop the trolley. This all seem the natural response we should have to this example. With a decision like this, we want and need more of a context to decide it in. I think this shows that whatever decision is made in Mill’s empty example that it isn’t really an accurate measure of the pleasure and pain scale, since the lack of context also takes away the reference points by which to judge which decision will bring the most pleasure and pain.
Even if there was context though, I’m not sure I like this example any more. If the context was that each person had a loving family, the look in class is that it would bring more pleasure and less pain to save the five persons on the track instead of the one. Doing so would decrease the potential amount of pain by decreasing the number of persons who feel the pain. I really wonder if it does though, and find it hard to quantify pleasure and pain like this. One person’s pain at losing a loved one to me is not less than the pain of five person’s pain at losing loved ones. I guess in other words I believe that all the suffering in the world can be felt from one death, and that increasing the numbers of dead does not equal an increase of the suffering felt.
Friday, September 25, 2009
"Higher Pleasure" : A Question of Personal Opinion
I know we did not discuss Mill in his entirety, but after the brief discussion of the different "levels" of happiness, I began thinking about how humans to sometimes go to fulfill the "lower pleasures" rather than striving for the higher ones. This thought lead to other internal dialogue which ultimately lead me to the conclusion that one person's "higher pleasure" could be considered another person's "lower pleasure" or vice versa.
Granted the portion of Mill's Utilitarianism essay containing the statement "it is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied" is not in our book, the statement came up in class towards the end which launched my thought process in regards to happiness. After much research, I found the portion of Mill's essay where he states that "a pleasure is of higher quality if people would choose it over a different pleasure even if it is accompanied by discomfort, and if they would not trade it for a greater amount of the other pleasure." With that definition of "higher pleasure," one can easily deduct that one person's "higher pleasure" could be another person's "lower pleasure" or vice versa.
The example used in class of a homeless person not being able to gain knowledge of philosophy is fairly accurate. However, saying that the knowledge of philosophy is a "higher pleasure" is strictly subjective. Given the option of food, the homeless person would most likely choose it over learning about philosophy even if it means he would have to dig through the trash, fulfilling Mill's definition of "higher pleasure." While knowledge of philosophy may seem like a "higher pleasure" due to its long lasting fulfillment, it is not necessarily a "higher pleasure" in all cases. Therefore, the concept of "higher pleasure" is in fact subjective and varies from person to person.
Granted the portion of Mill's Utilitarianism essay containing the statement "it is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied" is not in our book, the statement came up in class towards the end which launched my thought process in regards to happiness. After much research, I found the portion of Mill's essay where he states that "a pleasure is of higher quality if people would choose it over a different pleasure even if it is accompanied by discomfort, and if they would not trade it for a greater amount of the other pleasure." With that definition of "higher pleasure," one can easily deduct that one person's "higher pleasure" could be another person's "lower pleasure" or vice versa.
The example used in class of a homeless person not being able to gain knowledge of philosophy is fairly accurate. However, saying that the knowledge of philosophy is a "higher pleasure" is strictly subjective. Given the option of food, the homeless person would most likely choose it over learning about philosophy even if it means he would have to dig through the trash, fulfilling Mill's definition of "higher pleasure." While knowledge of philosophy may seem like a "higher pleasure" due to its long lasting fulfillment, it is not necessarily a "higher pleasure" in all cases. Therefore, the concept of "higher pleasure" is in fact subjective and varies from person to person.
The (a)morality of Consequences
During our class discussions about both Kant and Mill, the issue of consequence has been heavily dissected. However, after talking to Doctor J about how the two perceive the importance of consequences when making decisions, I was interested in applying Kant’s view of consequence to Mill’s Greatest Happiness principle to see if it allowed for moral judgments.
Thursday, September 24, 2009
Problems with "Natural Justice"
Hume presented presents a system of justice based largely on observations of rational human nature. It involves a pseudo virtue that only exists within a society gripped with scarcity. As the solution to a societal problem, justice seemed seems to be more of an accepted tradition rather than an institution based on rational deduction. What evolves to be a good actionHume defines a “good” action to be is one which most people would praise, praise- independent of self-love or egoism. The concepts of Rright and wrong evoke feelings derived from moral sentiment. Those who would diverge from this innate moral sentiment would be labeled solipsists and unable to contribute to the notion of justice. Initially people buy into justice out of a self-interest for self-preservation. However, Tthey continue to promote those accepted traditions bydue to a sense of self-sympathy or the feeling of approval towards a “good” action.
Could the same ideas characterize our Honor Code? The Honor Code provides that members of the Rhodes College Community do not lie, cheat, or steal. Most would agree concur that agreeing to not engage in those activities clearly justifies not having to worry about being the victim of those actions. While there is an apparent self-interest in being able to leave your laptop in the Rat, do we still subscribe to the Code because of a feeling of self-sympathy? Do students genuinely feel a sentiment of approval when they observe a conscious decision not to lie, cheat, or steal? I would advocate that it is still a more self-interested approach. The College and many students up front would applaud a community that has agreed to abandon these actions but most of that comes from the assurance, or belief in an assurance, that your fellows will not lie to, cheat, or steal to or from you- not a feeling of approval when others choose not to engage in those actions.
The problem I have with much of Hume’s arguments stems from the fact he his claims that it is impossible to divorce sentiments from justice. If a suit is filed against another person, I would consider it just, and necessary, for the judge to make an impartial decision completely independent from feelings or sentiments. A murderer who is single with no family versus a murderer who is a single parent should receive the same punishment for their action despite the fact that I feel more sympathy towards the single-parent. While I believe this would be a just action by the judge, could Hume say the same?
Another example comes from a prominent Alabama businessman from Alabama whom I grew up hearing people around me continually deride. Last summer I worked at a facility he used to own and where he tried to force all of the employees to purchase toxic stocks which soonthat plummeted. According to Hume, human beings should feel an innate sentiment of approval to his conviction; however, most generally disapproved of the penalty handed down. Despite the fact that it was a comparable penalty to others who had committed similar white-collar crimes, it would be classified as unjust under this system. People wanted a harsher sentence simply because they disapproved. While everyone may have had the same sentiment of disapproval for the action, deeming it unjust, the sentiments over the sentence, or the action of the judge, are so varied that it is impossible to define it as one or the other.
Could the same ideas characterize our Honor Code? The Honor Code provides that members of the Rhodes College Community do not lie, cheat, or steal. Most would agree concur that agreeing to not engage in those activities clearly justifies not having to worry about being the victim of those actions. While there is an apparent self-interest in being able to leave your laptop in the Rat, do we still subscribe to the Code because of a feeling of self-sympathy? Do students genuinely feel a sentiment of approval when they observe a conscious decision not to lie, cheat, or steal? I would advocate that it is still a more self-interested approach. The College and many students up front would applaud a community that has agreed to abandon these actions but most of that comes from the assurance, or belief in an assurance, that your fellows will not lie to, cheat, or steal to or from you- not a feeling of approval when others choose not to engage in those actions.
The problem I have with much of Hume’s arguments stems from the fact he his claims that it is impossible to divorce sentiments from justice. If a suit is filed against another person, I would consider it just, and necessary, for the judge to make an impartial decision completely independent from feelings or sentiments. A murderer who is single with no family versus a murderer who is a single parent should receive the same punishment for their action despite the fact that I feel more sympathy towards the single-parent. While I believe this would be a just action by the judge, could Hume say the same?
Another example comes from a prominent Alabama businessman from Alabama whom I grew up hearing people around me continually deride. Last summer I worked at a facility he used to own and where he tried to force all of the employees to purchase toxic stocks which soonthat plummeted. According to Hume, human beings should feel an innate sentiment of approval to his conviction; however, most generally disapproved of the penalty handed down. Despite the fact that it was a comparable penalty to others who had committed similar white-collar crimes, it would be classified as unjust under this system. People wanted a harsher sentence simply because they disapproved. While everyone may have had the same sentiment of disapproval for the action, deeming it unjust, the sentiments over the sentence, or the action of the judge, are so varied that it is impossible to define it as one or the other.
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
Queries for Kant
Generally I'm well disposed towards Immanuel Kant; the genius of his work is the air-tight quality of his reasoning that leaves precious little room to maneuver if one wishes to dispute him. As with any such idealistic school of thought, however, Kant's ideas tend to become bogged down in discussion with particular imagined contingencies and scenarios, e.g., the Anne Frank objection to Kant's interpretation of the categorical imperative to say that lying is never justified. When, in class, it was suggested that surely dishonesty would be the right course of action if it meant saving a life, the rejoinder was that not only is the exact concequence of an action unknowable, but that the categorical imperative would not prevent the individual in such as case from taking other action to prevent the injustice (fighting or killing the Nazis was the example given).
On further reflection however, this response seems inadequate. The choice to lie, according to Kant, reflects the maxim "It is acceptable to lie" regardless of the concequences of that paricular untruth (such as saving Anne Frank from the Nazis), and no rational person would will that maxim to be universal. However, to say it would be acceptable to kill in order to prevent loss of life seems to me to run into the same problem, since the maxim reflected by such a choice would appear to be "It is acceptable to kill". Obviously nobody wills this to be a universal law, even as we generally agree that deadly force is acceptable in certain contexts. In effect, we hold to the maxim that "It is wrong to kill... except when it isn't." It is difficult to see how this common-sense perspective can hold up under the categorical imperative while lying is in every circumstance deemed immoral.
One possible reponse to this objection would be Kant's identificaiton of justice with the right to use coercion; hence, if it is injust that Anne Frank should be arrested and murdered merely for being Jewish, any individual has the right to use coercion to prevent this from occuring (in an extremely similar way to John Locke's conception of the state of nature). However, one wonders what this right encompasses, and whether there is implied a fundamental distinction between using physical force (which in other instances is deemed immoral) and deception to prevent an injustice. If so, violence (or other froms of direct coercion) appears to attain some sort of unique moral status.
The problem lies in the notion of which maxim a particular action reflects; if it is concieved broadly, then Kant's rationalistic notion of moral principles holds up well (it seems self-evident that no person would make dishonesty universally permitted). But to justify the use of deadly force as an alternative to the immoral lie (no matter how well intentioned) seems to require a more narrow maxim which states "it is acceptable to use force to correct or prevent an injustice." The devil is in the details.
Monday, September 21, 2009
Dr. Crosby and Justice
During both of Dr. Crosby's talks on Philosophy and Religion, the question of Justice was begging to be asked. Much like traditional religions, his religion of nature (a philosophy of nature as well) appeals to a sense of respect for individual intrinsic entities (and their value). Animals and trees are regarded on the same level as humans (in so far as they have value in themselves and outside on our dependence on them), and in this respect, is could possibly create a very different form of justice. Other thinkers have invoked ideas of property or other social facts as the origin of justice, but perhaps each individual's ultimate property is that of his/her or it's own life. And thus, since Dr. Crosby is regarding all living things in equal right and might to humans, justice must include these non-human, non-social, non-property (in the sense of land, land rover's, etc), driven interactions. He mentioned that we are animals in nature that must kill to survive, just as other animals have. But as omnivores, and rational creatures in nature, we also have the choice to refrain from that. And thus my question to ya'll is: should justice involve non-humans, and if such a justice could exist, wouldn't it be one sided in so far as only the human component could be responsible for the justice or injustice? And lastly, if such a justice can exist (the aforementioned one-sided example), can that really be justice, when it is not a true interaction, and rather just an action by one superior being reasoned into action upon an inferior being. Do we hold the non-rational animals to justice? No, for lack of reason. So what makes killing endangered animals unjust?
Problems for Hume
To continue the trend set by Dev, I was also going to respond to the blog with a long comment. Fortunately, this long enough to stand on its own. So I advise you to read the first blog, then Dev’s response, and then this. I apologize for all that work.
There are several major problems with the evolution example. According to Hume, natural justice is a subjective institution that is established by society. Society chooses to approve of actions that become institutionalized and accepted as just. So, if justice is a conscious decision that is made by society, your five fingers example doesn’t work. Society chooses what is just or unjust, evolution does not give humans the ability to consciously choose between 3 or 5 fingers. The key difference is choice. Your example removes the crucial choice element.
However, your evolution example does help to highlight another major problem with cultural norms. Even if we can recognize a cultural norm and even if we can widely agree that it is just, how do we change it? In other words, can society change its mind and deem something that was once acceptable as now unjust? For example, if it accepts slavery as just, can it ever change its mind? If it can, then how long does it take to implement that slow-as-molasses process? That is the problem with cultural norms. It is ambiguous because it does not provide clear rules or procedures to follow. Instead, we should rely on a set of universal laws that guide our conduct.
Secondly, we aren’t at disagreement that justice exists everywhere. However, the fact that justice exists everywhere is not at all what “universal law” means. That is exactly the opposite of “universal law”. By definition, universal laws are laws that must be the same everywhere. They are absolute. The whole point is that morals are not relative. We have one set of values (given by God or inherent in nature) that guide us. Certain actions are always wrong and unjust because they conflict with the natural law. That is why Hume’s description of natural justice is problematic.
In Defense of Hume's "Natural Justice"
This post was actually going to be a comment. But it’s long enough, so I’m taking advantage of the system. So for anyone reading this post, I would urge you to read Mr. Cull’s before you read this one. And here we go:
I, of course, have some disagreements with Thomas' estimation (or should I say simplification) of Hume's argument. In response to the blatantly rhetorical question: "Who decides when a custom is institutionalized?" I must answer that, if natural justice arises out of an evolutionary process, no one decides it in the sense that they vote on it. The question sounds to me like someone asking, why do human hands have five fingers? No one specifically decided that fact. In our early days, we used our hands in such a way as to necessitate five fingers instead of three.
My second point of contention is with the argument that Hume's idea of natural justice leans toward a kind of lazy relativist approach to justice. I don't think Hume is saying that cannibalism is just simply because it exists. That is a lazy relativist fallacy. In fact Hume seems to say the opposite when he argues that our conceptions of justice are imposed seemingly arbitrarily on the random occurences that happen in this world. The actual event of one dude's eating another dude is not in itself bad unless we impose a certain sense of justice on that action. That imposition is what makes unjust.
So in connecting these two ideas, the idea that we as humans have evolved and the idea that our conceptions are in fact impositions of our slowly evolving selves, we can see a strong implicit argument that the idea of justice has, itself, evolved along with our practical use of it. When our concept of what is just expands, our practical use of it should find a better fit.
Another point Hume makes places him in the anti-relativist basket. He writes, "The convenience, or rather necessity, which leads to justice is so universal, and everywhere points so much to the same rules, that the habit takes place in all societies..." So, the idea of justice actually is universal. We all agree on the benefits of just society, we just differ on the particulars of the practice of just action.
While I say this, I understand your point about specific practices within societies that are seemingly unjust. Dudes eating other dudes seems wrong. But what I think is so ingenious of Hume's argument is simply that he leaves room for a progression toward an expanded agreement on justice. If we all agree that the general principle of justice is good (that justice is what is most beneficial to everyone)but specific societies seem to do unjust actions, then all that we have to do to get toward a more just (globally just) society is to start a dialogue with the supposedly unjust societies.
The more I turn Hume over in my head, the more I like him, because his theory of natural justice both takes the reality of differing views of particular justice into account while allowing humanity the ability to evolve toward a state of justerness (which I know is definitely not a word).
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice
Harvard economist and Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen has written a book entitled The Idea of Justice that is being heralded as one of the best publications in years on the topic. Last week, there was an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education about Sen's book ("Amartya Sen Shakes Up Justice Theory"), which helpfully explains how Sen's theory fits in with the longer philosophical history of theories of justice. I highly recommend it to students in this course.
Sunday, September 20, 2009
A Manufactured Justice
In his treatise, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume argues that natural justice arises from cultural norms. A set of customs slowly develops over time and transforms into what he calls “natural justice.” I find this view problematic. A system of laws that arises out of custom are difficult to identify. How do we recognize these customs? What are the requirements for a custom? Who decides when a custom is institutionalized? How many individuals must agree on a custom before it is a cultural norm (and therefore a part of natural justice)? Can these customs change?
The inherent ambiguities with Hume’s “cultural norms” argument makes it difficult to identify exactly what “natural justice” is.
If natural justice arises from cultural norms, then it must follow that natural justice is relative. The cultural norms of one society can be entirely different from the norms of another. One act (such as cannibalism) may be strictly proscribed in one society, but encouraged in another. The act may be deemed “just” in one place, but entirely unjust in another.
If justice is indeed relative, it appears that Hume would agree that there is not one set of moral standards that are universal and everlasting (such as the idea that murder is bad). There is no “moral code” to guide conduct. The justness (I think that’s a word) or unjustness of an action is entirely dependent on the society in which it takes place.
But isn’t that just the opposite of natural justice?
Natural justice, as Aquinas and Vitoria understood it, is a higher law that transcends human beings and their social rules. It is a set of everlasting laws that humans are bound to follow. Therefore, society cannot create natural justice through their cultural customs. Instead, natural justice should be a guide for societal justice. We should model our rules and definition of justice around universal and unchanging laws (laws that apply everywhere and do not change). That is what is truly just.
The origin of this natural law is irrelevant (whether the laws are given by God or whether they are inherent in nature does not matter). Either way, the law is immutable and eternal. Those are the primary characteristics of natural law.
Here’s another way to look at it: justice isn’t whatever we say it is (through our cultural norms). It is a guide for our conduct that helps to distinguish between right and wrong. I have no doubt that Hume was aware of this. He probably would respond by disagreeing with the idea of a “universal morality.” If I am right in anticipating his response, then there is nothing “natural” about Hume’s definition of justice. His “natural justice” is not inherent in nature nor is it unchanging. Instead, it, as I understand it, relies on a utilitarian principle. Natural justice is what the majority of people say that it is. The survival of cultural norms indicates that they are widely agreed upon and, therefore, just.
The actions of the majority are not necessarily just. In fact, the actions of the majority tend to be made at the expense of weaker minorities. Slavery in the mid-19th century, for example, oppressed tens of thousands of blacks. One would be hard pressed to find someone deem that “just” simply because the majority deemed it useful and agreeable to the majority. Although one might argue that slavery was unjust and that is why the slaves were emancipated, that would still require that slavery be at some point in time deemed just.
Sunday, September 13, 2009
So, whos paying for the ipod?
I was recently involved in a situation which reminded me very much of our class discussions. My roommates and I were about to go out and purchase an ipod player for the room. However, the one we wanted to buy was on the expensive side and we were trying to figure out who was going to buy it. Obviously, whoever ended up buying it would be the one who kept it for after this school year. Still, none of us wanted to shell out the large amount of cash. Finally, I put forth the idea that someone should pay a about half, and the rest of the roommates should combine to pay the other half. My rational behind this idea was that I everyone would enjoy using the player over the duration of the year, but only one would end up keeping it. Therefore, three of us should pay for our time with it and the fourth should pay for the honor of keeping it past graduation. After thinking this idea over we all decided that it was rather intelligent and went along with it. In case you were wondering, I was not the one who put forth the half on my own...
Anyway, upon looking back on this I thought about the various ideas of justice we have discussed in class and whether either Plato or Aristotle would agree with our decision. Honestly, I dont think either of them would. They would each try to make an arguement for one of us to pay for all of it. Now, seeing as I would not agree with such a conclusion, I am asking if I may have missed something... Would either Plaot or Aristotle agree with our conclusion?
If not, then I may be so bold to argue that their ideas on justice may be logical in some instances, but not rational in others. Personally, I think that there is always going to be reasons to argue for or against somthing and it will always come down to point of view. I do not think that there is going to be one optimal conclusion to every problem, and that one should be open minded to others views on what is just.
Anyway, upon looking back on this I thought about the various ideas of justice we have discussed in class and whether either Plato or Aristotle would agree with our decision. Honestly, I dont think either of them would. They would each try to make an arguement for one of us to pay for all of it. Now, seeing as I would not agree with such a conclusion, I am asking if I may have missed something... Would either Plaot or Aristotle agree with our conclusion?
If not, then I may be so bold to argue that their ideas on justice may be logical in some instances, but not rational in others. Personally, I think that there is always going to be reasons to argue for or against somthing and it will always come down to point of view. I do not think that there is going to be one optimal conclusion to every problem, and that one should be open minded to others views on what is just.
Distributive Justice And All…
I know the issue of distributive justice has been written about already, but I wanted to cover my own little corner of it as well.
While the whole idea of distributive justice, or the balance between one’s merit and the wealth that they therefore receive from it, seems like an ideal situation for the distribution of wealth among society, I feel that it is an impossible if not ridiculously expectant program.
This ideal of geometric proportion and meritocracy seems impossible to accurately control. This balance between merit and wealth obviously proves hard to arrive at, or our society would today have this ideal stably in place. The biggest problem that I see in the concept is the decision of who would determine the level of merit that another person has, therefore determining how much wealth they would accumulate. How does one pick the correct judge of this? I feel that it is not something that can be adequately judged by another person, for the merit of some runs deeper than what is outwardly shown many times. Is it then that the best solution is to put this judgment into the hands of a higher power? And if this were the case would the inequality already seen in today’s society not already be resolved?
Furthermore, if society were to come up with a solution on how to judge merit, how would it be enforced? If a being were low in the amount of personal merit, they then would get less in wealth, correct? Well it seems to me that they would then be more inclined to forcefully take what they want, in no way recognizing this established rule of proportion, due in part to the lack of merit that they hold. This counteracts the system altogether, since it would also cause those who actually have merit to potentially lose what is rightly theirs to the people with less merit that are forcefully taking what they desire.
It just seems like this objective of having a meritocracy in a human society is not viable. Since we have no way to correctly judge the merit of others, we cannot correctly deem the portion of wealth that others receive. Therefore this whole idea, enticing as it is to fantasize about, is about as probable as the chance of Professor Johnson coming in to the next class and saying “Instead of class from now on we’re going to watch ‘It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia’ and bake cupcakes.” As wonderful as that would be, it is just not going to happen.
While the whole idea of distributive justice, or the balance between one’s merit and the wealth that they therefore receive from it, seems like an ideal situation for the distribution of wealth among society, I feel that it is an impossible if not ridiculously expectant program.
This ideal of geometric proportion and meritocracy seems impossible to accurately control. This balance between merit and wealth obviously proves hard to arrive at, or our society would today have this ideal stably in place. The biggest problem that I see in the concept is the decision of who would determine the level of merit that another person has, therefore determining how much wealth they would accumulate. How does one pick the correct judge of this? I feel that it is not something that can be adequately judged by another person, for the merit of some runs deeper than what is outwardly shown many times. Is it then that the best solution is to put this judgment into the hands of a higher power? And if this were the case would the inequality already seen in today’s society not already be resolved?
Furthermore, if society were to come up with a solution on how to judge merit, how would it be enforced? If a being were low in the amount of personal merit, they then would get less in wealth, correct? Well it seems to me that they would then be more inclined to forcefully take what they want, in no way recognizing this established rule of proportion, due in part to the lack of merit that they hold. This counteracts the system altogether, since it would also cause those who actually have merit to potentially lose what is rightly theirs to the people with less merit that are forcefully taking what they desire.
It just seems like this objective of having a meritocracy in a human society is not viable. Since we have no way to correctly judge the merit of others, we cannot correctly deem the portion of wealth that others receive. Therefore this whole idea, enticing as it is to fantasize about, is about as probable as the chance of Professor Johnson coming in to the next class and saying “Instead of class from now on we’re going to watch ‘It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia’ and bake cupcakes.” As wonderful as that would be, it is just not going to happen.
Plato and Aristotle
Like Jonathan, I found it much more enjoyable to read Aristotle than Plato. I found some things in Plato’s writing to be unsettling, and found more comfort in the words of Aristotle, though I recognize that they seem to reach similar conclusions. Plato’s ideas about how everyone has their own ergon, work, that they are supposed to do in their life doesn’t sit very well with me in the sense that I’ve been taught to believe in the American dream, and people’s ability to move up from nothing, and also because it goes against the more existential idea that people are completely free to choose their own path in life. But once I moved past these very initial concerns, I was able to focus on what was a rather large similarity between Plato and Aristotle, which is this idea of balance, or harmony. For Plato, he creates this City-Soul analogy, in which the rulers of the city, who are wise and virtuous, are analogous to the Reason of the soul. The Auxiliaries are comparable to the spirit, which is the part of the soul that wills things, and can be swayed either way, but most often towards wisdom. Lastly, he says that the craftspeople of the town are like the appetites of the soul, which are desires, and only aimed at satisfying themselves. Plato says that in both scenarios (the city and the soul), health, balance, and order equals justice. For Aristotle, he comes up with a lot of ways to talk about justice, and a lot of ways to break justice down into different categories. But overall, Aristotle says that justice is the absence of excess and deficiency, which he calls the Golden Mean, and goes on to say that virtues are always going to be the mean between excess and deficiency. There cannot be a golden mean of injustice because by its very definition, injustice is already an excess or deficiency. Another important measure for Aristotle is this idea of proportionality and Justice in Exchange, which is defined as getting what you earned, no more and no less. There should be a proportional relationship between what people get and what they merit. This idea comes up in Plato too, he talks about Pleonexia, which is the habit/tendency of people to get more than they are due. Both Plato and Aristotle would agree that this is injustice.
On a more personal belief level, I have found myself struggling with this. In theory, I like this idea that people get exactly what they deserve, merit, and believe that society will work best if people are appropriately rewarded based on what they are merited. But maybe because we do not live in the perfect world that Plato describes, it just seems like that is not always going to be possible. And moreover, how does this idea completely go against my political support of national healthcare, based on the belief that all Americans should have access to medical treatment, regardless of their job, income, etc.? I know we talked about this in class one day, but it just seems that there must be some way to reconcile the two.
Meritocracy?
A meritocracy is a very attractive form of government to me, and I believe it is attractive to others in this course as well. It seems the most “fair” among the systems, as long as it is allowed to work in an environment that fosters equality. To some, America’s government claims to be a meritocracy not far from Aristotle’s view of distributive justice. Aristotle’s view that justice is a mean and a “zero sum game” is not a view held in common by many Americans, but the most who believe that America strives to be a meritocracy support his view of distributive justice. Every person who is virtuous and hard working deserves more than those individuals who do not.
The major flaw in meritocracies is inequality of opportunity. For example, if a person has a desire to go to graduate school, they are going to have an easier time attending the more expensive schools without the use of scholarships. In contrast, a less wealthy individual will have to work harder to get into the same school because they must make the grades that merit a large scholarship, which the wealthy individual need not make. In this case the wealthy individual has the advantage, so the system would seem to be unmeritocratic. The distribution of justice is unequal, because the individual who works harder is suffering an injustice.There is an element of meritocracy unaccounted for in this argument, and that is the right of the one who originally made the money. Most likely, the ancestor, be it recent or remote, made the money by means appropriate to meritocracy. Of course this is not always the case, but generally when there is wealth in a family someone worked diligently to acquire it. Because they worked and earned the money, it is their right to do with it what they seem fit, according to meritocracy. If their wish is to give their descendents an advantage over others in the future, then they have a right to do so.
According to Aristotle, the individual who receives the money would most likely not merit it because they did nothing to earn it other than being born. They must also earn their goods by their own means. Currently in America, the advantage is certainly with wealthy, and I doubt that in many times throughout history that the advantage has been with the poor. According to a meritocracy, is it the right of the individuals who worked hard to secure a possibly un-merited advantage for their descendants? Aristotle’s meritocracy would say no, but the American version of meritocracy has decided that it is their right.
Not Just A Major
After reading Jonathon's post, I felt invigorated, as though it was my sophomore year, and I was in pat shade's ethics class experiencing the same revelation. I alluded to this same fact in a comment to his post, but I felt this was important enough to solicit another post. As I commented, I am a senior philosophy major, and thus, some of these themes and thinkers can be repetitive and one (me) can easily fall into a bit of a delirious drone-like philosophy stupor. Hearing a personal account of that some one's connection between book (ideals) and life, as we all do, reminds us (and reopens our eyes to) what makes philosophy so special; it is not just a major, it is a way (and understanding) of life. That may sound bizarre to some of you, but just wait; you will understand in the time so come. Understanding that this is not just a class on social and political philosophy, or a class on justice is key; this is about justice in your life, about how we interact with other people, how we have gone wrong, and perhaps how we should fix it. It should drive you to desire those ideals you agree upon and to implement them in every aspect of your life. Plato's account of the soul may not be perfect, but striving for some resemblance of a just soul is an absolutely respectable endeavor.
And with that, also know that this class is the tip of the iceberg; there is much to learn, so much to question, so much to change, there is a place for every person to find purpose. You just have to do a little searching, philosophy can be your guide.
Congrats to you Jonathon, good luck to the rest, and thanks for reopening my tired eyes.
-Walter
P.S.
With all of that said, I would like to take this time for a shameless plug: If every person could have this revelation in grade school, imagine how much better off this world could be. If we insist on separating church and state (which I believe is a good idea) we might want to think about substituting something for the therapy of our souls. We don't have to believe in God, Jesus, Buddha, etc to believe in the good; and that seems to be what has happened. We have acquired the science to disprove God, logically removed it removed it from our lives, and now something must fill that void.
And with that, also know that this class is the tip of the iceberg; there is much to learn, so much to question, so much to change, there is a place for every person to find purpose. You just have to do a little searching, philosophy can be your guide.
Congrats to you Jonathon, good luck to the rest, and thanks for reopening my tired eyes.
-Walter
P.S.
With all of that said, I would like to take this time for a shameless plug: If every person could have this revelation in grade school, imagine how much better off this world could be. If we insist on separating church and state (which I believe is a good idea) we might want to think about substituting something for the therapy of our souls. We don't have to believe in God, Jesus, Buddha, etc to believe in the good; and that seems to be what has happened. We have acquired the science to disprove God, logically removed it removed it from our lives, and now something must fill that void.
Distributive Justice in the U.S.
When I first encountered Aristotle's idea of distributive justice, I believed that I had found a theory that lined up directly with my own. I have always believed that merit and wealth should be proportionate to one another. While I used to believe that this was, for the most part, the case in the U.S., my views have certainly changed in the past few years. I recognize that while some would argue that there is a strong form of distributive justice in the U.S., my faith in the system seems to diminish as I gain more knowledge of both the U.S. system as well as systems of the past.
The idea of distributive justice is wonderful, at least in my own views, and here lies one of the major hindrances to its realization. While some like myself do not desire to have wealth beyond their wildest dreams, there are still a great many who do. So if these individuals seek great wealth, and many achieve it, there must be those who have very little wealth, and thus less merit? While some of the impoverished individuals certainly may have less merit, there are those that are poor who if given the opportunity would certainly "merit" more wealth. What of those individuals that must drop out of school in order to support their four younger siblings and mother? Do we encourage this individual to leave his family behind in order to "merit" greater wealth? Is there virtue in leaving behind children, brothers and sisters, to attain higher education? We praise those who overcome seemingly impossible circumstances to achieve what is considered success, but forget about far greater number of individuals who are not able to overcome the impossible.
Meanwhile, there are those individuals who inherit everything they will ever need. Most, like myself, must work to attain a fair amount of wealth. But this does not mean that I did not have my opportunities laid out for me from birth. I have was given a great education, as well as the time to excel by my parents. I did not have to work in high school, and never had to worry about feeding my younger brother. So how does one balance between the millions of individuals and their differing levels of merit?
Now allow rectificatory justice to step in. The rectificatory justice idea is supposed to correct unbalance, which based on humanity's track record is sure to occur. But really, this form of justice is designed for criminality and immoral action. I do not see in it an ability to correct the injustice that faces many of the impoverished individuals in the U.S.
But one of the reasons that the U.S. is able to be a leader in innovation, technology, and wealth, is the ability of individuals to attain a much greater wealth than they merit. But I will admit that I have begun to doubt in the value of a great deal of the "innovation" made possible by the unbalance of wealth. Such a great deal of wealth goes into making lives more comfortable...for the wealthy! This is not to say that there is certainly a large amount of wealth that goes toward medical research and technology that truly could change the world in a way that aids those in need, but where do we draw the line? I personally believe that until the American dream becomes less about individual wealth and glory, true distributive justice will not exist. Please enlighten me if you have more hope for the U.S. than I do.
The idea of distributive justice is wonderful, at least in my own views, and here lies one of the major hindrances to its realization. While some like myself do not desire to have wealth beyond their wildest dreams, there are still a great many who do. So if these individuals seek great wealth, and many achieve it, there must be those who have very little wealth, and thus less merit? While some of the impoverished individuals certainly may have less merit, there are those that are poor who if given the opportunity would certainly "merit" more wealth. What of those individuals that must drop out of school in order to support their four younger siblings and mother? Do we encourage this individual to leave his family behind in order to "merit" greater wealth? Is there virtue in leaving behind children, brothers and sisters, to attain higher education? We praise those who overcome seemingly impossible circumstances to achieve what is considered success, but forget about far greater number of individuals who are not able to overcome the impossible.
Meanwhile, there are those individuals who inherit everything they will ever need. Most, like myself, must work to attain a fair amount of wealth. But this does not mean that I did not have my opportunities laid out for me from birth. I have was given a great education, as well as the time to excel by my parents. I did not have to work in high school, and never had to worry about feeding my younger brother. So how does one balance between the millions of individuals and their differing levels of merit?
Now allow rectificatory justice to step in. The rectificatory justice idea is supposed to correct unbalance, which based on humanity's track record is sure to occur. But really, this form of justice is designed for criminality and immoral action. I do not see in it an ability to correct the injustice that faces many of the impoverished individuals in the U.S.
But one of the reasons that the U.S. is able to be a leader in innovation, technology, and wealth, is the ability of individuals to attain a much greater wealth than they merit. But I will admit that I have begun to doubt in the value of a great deal of the "innovation" made possible by the unbalance of wealth. Such a great deal of wealth goes into making lives more comfortable...for the wealthy! This is not to say that there is certainly a large amount of wealth that goes toward medical research and technology that truly could change the world in a way that aids those in need, but where do we draw the line? I personally believe that until the American dream becomes less about individual wealth and glory, true distributive justice will not exist. Please enlighten me if you have more hope for the U.S. than I do.
Saturday, September 12, 2009
Zero Sum Game: Fact or Fiction?
Last class, we talked about two concepts that help explain how justice works, the Golden Mean and the idea of a zero sum game. Of the two, the zero sum game idea spoke to me and made me think about how it would work. After examining the belief that a situation in which one's gain or loss is balanced by the losses or gains of others would result in justice, I came to the conclusion that the American justice system is more flawed and less just that I had originally thought.
In class, we touched on the fact that in the American justice system, an assault on one's life could be equated with a certain amount of time in prison, a rather unequal exchange. However, we failed to discuss that fact that in today's society, one can sue for almost anything and receive some sort of compensation. I'm not talking about the cases in which a person is unjustly wronged and deserves some kind of payback, but in the situations where people cheat the system and sue foe ridiculous things and receive a hefty amount of money.
In 2003, a woman sued McDonald's for causing her husband to gain 200 pounds. Though it can technically be considered an injustice since her husband did not know that eating McDonald's would cause a weight gain, her reward of $1.35 million is disproportionate. At the very most, a Gastric Bypass Surgery, which could remove her husband's fat, costs $65,000. This means that the wife receieved $1.26 million more than was necessary for it to be a zero sum game.
While Aristotle's "mertiocrocy" works in a completely just world, it is not the standard for the American justice system. When people constantly prove that exchanges between actions and punishments are unequal, it causes me to wonder if a soceity in which there is a sort of zero sum game for punishments can truly exist.
In class, we touched on the fact that in the American justice system, an assault on one's life could be equated with a certain amount of time in prison, a rather unequal exchange. However, we failed to discuss that fact that in today's society, one can sue for almost anything and receive some sort of compensation. I'm not talking about the cases in which a person is unjustly wronged and deserves some kind of payback, but in the situations where people cheat the system and sue foe ridiculous things and receive a hefty amount of money.
In 2003, a woman sued McDonald's for causing her husband to gain 200 pounds. Though it can technically be considered an injustice since her husband did not know that eating McDonald's would cause a weight gain, her reward of $1.35 million is disproportionate. At the very most, a Gastric Bypass Surgery, which could remove her husband's fat, costs $65,000. This means that the wife receieved $1.26 million more than was necessary for it to be a zero sum game.
While Aristotle's "mertiocrocy" works in a completely just world, it is not the standard for the American justice system. When people constantly prove that exchanges between actions and punishments are unequal, it causes me to wonder if a soceity in which there is a sort of zero sum game for punishments can truly exist.
Plato's Control
In Plato's ideal city, he censors poets, controls the general population by means of a Noble Lie, arranges coupling between mates, and exercises total control over almost every facet of life. This is how he manages to attain justice in the city, and this is supposed to translate to the individual soul. So in our society, where (almost) any person can do any job, create art to be seen by almost anyone via the internet, and overall there is a general lack of the sort of control present in the Republic, is it possible that our souls are also out of control? Everyday, even if we don't watch television or use the internet (which is obviously not the case), we are bombarded by images (posters and billboards) and ideas (ie: the American Dream) that Plato would not allow in his just city. So can we even hope to achieve justice if Plato only manages to do so by exercising a total control that is impossible for us?
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