In the News

Guantanamo Bay is in the news again, for two different reasons. Firstly, I saw this story: http://www.kcbs.com/pages/5669356.php? on the CBS Evening News on Friday. The big story is that the U.S. government has chosen to hold trials for “9/11 mastermind” Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other terrorists associated with the September 11 World Trade Center attacks in New York City just blocks from the former site of the two towers, instead of trying them in a military court.

Of course there are many people against this decision citing issues of national security, but some objections are not so much out of concern for the safety of American citizens but for the protection of government procedures employed while the men were detained in Gitmo. The article does not identify who has voiced these concerns, but it does state that trial in a civilian court may force the court to deal with issues surrounding “interrogation techniques” used on the prisoners including waterboarding, which was used on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed a total of 183 times. Is this a legitimate concern? What I mean by that is, does the U.S. government, by trying these terrorists in a civilian court, run the risk of exposing itself and its controversial practices? Could this possibly lead to somehow putting torture on trial, and a reinvigoration of anti-torture lobbying?

In a similar vein, the article quotes some civilians who lost loved ones on 9/11/2001 who are against a civilian trial because the defense attorneys could make their clients out to be “victims” of our system and induce sympathy for the terrorists. Personally, I don’t think any jury of American citizens would sympathize with the orchestrators of the 9/11 attacks, so this concern is moot. But, considering our discussions in class these past two weeks, should we consider the terrorists who have possibly experienced the worst forms of torture over the course of the past few years “victims” of the American system?

Secondly, this issue has come to light today: http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/11/15/illinois.next.gitmo/index.html and as I type this, I am watching this story further unfold on CNN. A mostly empty maximum security prison in Illinois, Thomson Correctional Center, has been identified as the most likely new home for current detainees in Guantanamo Bay. While I think the main issue discussed here is the ramifications that housing the prisoners there would have for the city of Chicago and the state of Illinois, I think the big picture is more important.

President Obama has pledged for a while now that he would close Guantanamo Bay; the deadline was originally set for January 22, 2010, but it has been suspected for a while now that the deadline would not be met. I think this initiative, to locate an adequate alternative facility for Gitmo’s current prisoners, is a step in the right direction, and it also assuages the doubt that the Obama administration is actually working to achieve its stated goal. While there is no guarantee that abhorrent practices such as torture will cease once the detainees are relocated, there is hope that our government is working to right the inadmissible wrongs committed in the name of national security.

Truth Commissions and Determinism

It seems the arguments in favor of torture have all been exhausted and shown as not only immoral, but impractical. The new arguments concern truth commissions and their validity and practicality. Do truth commissions bring about justice for crimes against humanity? Is amnesty in exchange for truth worth letting the criminal go?
In class, there have been several allusions to studies showing that amnesty helps the victims of the crime more than simply punishing the criminal. I’ve never read these studies, but am willing to take Dr. Johnson’s word for it. What interests me about the argument for truth rather than punishment is how it works into determinism. If determinism is granted as true, then there can be no culpability, and thus no moral grounds on which to blame the criminals. Punishment under determinism is ungrounded, so it seems like gaining the truth in order to help the victims is obviously a better option. The criminal is not punished for something that was going to happen anyway, and those affected by the crime will supposedly be better off.
Trying to fit justice into determinism is very difficult, but in the case of truth commissions, it seems to fit quite nicely at times. When considering egregious crimes against humanity, it is hard to settle on what the best punishment or retribution for the crime should be. The people affected should be compensated for their loss somehow, and it should also be demonstrated that we, as humans, will not accept the occurrence of these crimes. It makes sense to allow for the criminals to gain amnesty for the truth if that is what brings about the best for the victims and for world knowledge. In a sense, this is a utilitarian idea, for it brings about the most pleasure for the most people. This can also work with determinism because we are declaring that these actions are indeed wrong, but not enforcing culpability onto the individual. Obviously, truth commissions do hold those that committed the crimes responsible for their actions, but by granting amnesty they do not act on this culpability.
I realize when writing this that I’m using moral grounds to defend amnesty in exchange for truth, all the while, toting determinism, but in the scope of this argument I believe it is acceptable. I am merely trying to argue that certain aspects of truth commissions can be accepted by determinism.

Torture Revisited

In the course of our discussions on the morality of torture, an important distinction was made between the definition of tourture (or what specific methods constitute torture) and whether torture itself is justified; to this end, we were urged to think of "whatever we consider torture" when weighing its morality, to avoid becoming bogged down in the specifics of whether putting panties on a prisoner's head is equivalent to mutilation. 

I suspect a similar danger of obfuscation has arisen in the considerable effort devoted to debunking the effectiveness of torture. It is all very good to say that torture leads to unreliable information and therefore may cause more harm than good, but there are always factual arguments for either position, and they are besides the point for one who assents to the proposition that "you cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.  Likewise, there is little use arguing that innocents may be swept up into the practice of torture; this merely an argument for torturing carefully. These practical arguments against torture rest on the comforting illusion that a choice need never be made between ideals and material interests. Yet this line of argument effectively concedes the terms of debate to a utilitarian paradigm, and it is obvious that there are some reasonable practical arguments for the use of torture, otherwise it would never be advanced as a means of interrogation at all. Unreliable as torture may be, is it pure fantasy to assert that a situation will never arise where such methods could provide appreciable, even life-saving benefits.

In asserting that torture should never be preformed under any circumstances, even to save a life, one is effectively arguing that to torture someone is worse even than killing them (given that virtually everyone accepts the state-sponsored taking of life in the event of immediate danger). The case for this proposition rests on two observations, of which the first is intuitive: Torture revolts our basic human sensibilities. Hume after all, noted that men judge actions not only by their usefulness (utility) but by their agreeableness, and surely torture fails to live up to the latter stipulation. All this is too subjective for some however; the second, more universalist contention, rests on a view of man as a uniquely rational or spiritual being. Interogational torture uses physical force (or psychological trauma) to overcome his inner self, to violate the sanctum of his own mind and will at the most basic level. It implicitly devalues him as a human being, and in a sense, all humanity, by abusing those faculties which, unlike his mere physical form, make him a human being. In Kantian terms, it is the ultimate use of another as a "means" rather than an "end", as the inner self is reduced to a source of information to be extracted.

Anyone who undertakes to defend the human rights of a terrorist is already likely not to be particularly utilitarian in their ethical orientation. Those who assert that torture doesn't work are not making a moral argument, though they may be making a useful political point.

Truth commissions and... "cheaters!?!?!?

This week in class the main topic has been torture, and truth commissions. I know that a lot has been said about truth commissions, but there was one particular thing that peaked my interests. In class on Mon we were talking about how truth commissions, in order to receive the whole truth from criminals, offer amnesty to the perpetrators of the violations of human rights.

But, the immediate objection was raised in class that, if these violators of human rights are given amnesty does that mean that nothing happens to them? The answer was, yes. That if a perpetrator of a human rights violation that has been committed on the behalf of a political party then the violator is granted just what they are promised: complete freedom from the punishment of the justice system for their crimes.

Dr.J’s response to this objection was that in these settings of truth commissions, it is often such a relief to the victims, their families, and the entire society as a whole that they are willing to grant this amnesty in return from the truth. This led to some explanation from Dr.J that the truth is powerful in many situations such as this that it actually relieves people to know the truth.

But, I have a slight variation on this claim. I would argue that it is not in fact the truth that sets these people free. But, that instead it is the perpetrator taking personal responsibility for their actions. I think that the truth does bring a certain relief but only in that it moves someone from an unsure position of inaction into a realm of clear necessity of action.

The example that this makes me think of is the show “cheaters”. On this show people that believe there significant others are being unfaithful to them recruit this squad of detectives that gather video and audio surveillance. At then end of the show they present this evidence of their significant other being unfaithful, and then take the recruiter to catch their respective girlfriend/boyfriend cheating on them.

What I have noticed from watching this show is that the recruiters rarely feel closure simply knowing the truth from watching the video or even when they witness their significant other actually being unfaithful. The true closure, and moving from the plain of the inability to act to the plain of sure action is when in fact they speak to their significant other and they confess, and take personal responsibility for their actions. In fact I have noticed that the “cheaters” who deny, or neglect to take personal responsibility by admitting what they have done are less likely to be taken back by their significant others. Weather this is because they appear remorseful or because they actually are taking responsibility I do not know. But, I think I can safely say that the acceptance of personal responsibility that comes with the admission of ones wrong doings does bring a feeling of relief the victims of all types of wrong doings.

Selective Investigations

I really enjoyed reading Priscilla Hayner’s Unspeakable Truths. Her presentation of the methodological issues in individual truth commissions, as well as the relationship between the government and the truth commission in that country, was really thought-provoking. However, what I found the most interesting was her multi-chapter long discussion on the technical aspects of truth commission mandates that have far-reaching consequences, specifically identifying what the commission will actually investigate.

While each truth commission must set some guidelines on the specific types of human rights violations in will investigate, Hayner describes certain truth commissions whose mandates excluded obvious violations. In Argentina, the National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP) only documented disappearances (kidnapping with no reappearance of a body). The presidential decree that established the commission did not sanction the investigation of murder by armed forces, temporary disappearances, forced exile, torture, or even disappearances prior to 1976. The limits placed upon the commission directly limited those victims of the previous government who could receive reparations. The people who were tortured and the families who had lost their primary providers would not receive any of the monetary aid given by the state. The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in Chile also placed considerable limitations on which violations the commission could not investigate. In Chile, those people who were forced into exile, illegally detained, and tortured, but not killed, were not listed as victims on the commission’s final report.

As Hayner describes in her book, there were obvious feelings of outrage that these limitations were placed on what “truths” the commissions in Argentina and Chile could cover. Obviously this seems, in my opinion, to be unjust. How can governments, specifically the presidents of these countries, specify what they will allow to be recognized as human rights violations, and simply disregard other incidents? The atrocities that the truth commissions in Argentina and Chile were not allowed to report upon are identified as human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 5 states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” and in Article 9 it is stated that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.”

The Argentinean and Chilean truth commissions were not only prohibited from recognizing other atrocities in their final reports; they were also unable to identify all of the victims of human rights violations under the previous regime. What strikes me the most is that in both cases, people who were tortured were not listed as victims in the final reports. In class, we discussed torture as being the most dehumanizing thing a person can experience short of death. Perhaps this is why I find it so outrageous that neither commission was allowed to investigate acts of torture. Is it not unjust to allow some victims to hear the truth so that they can begin to heal, but deny others from even claiming the same status as victims, and therefore the same rights to truth and reconciliation?

Truth for Amnesty

During Wednesday’s class, we talked about the criticisms Hayner addresses in Unspeakable Truths against truth commissions. One of the ones that provoked a lot of discussion was the fact that some truth commissions grant amnesty in exchange for the truth. This belief seems like it’s a foreign idea, but the United States actually does this in certain cases.

For example, I was watching this one show about the Witness Protection program in America and in the episode, this guy who helped this mob boss “off” some people was granted protection so that he could testify against the mob boss. While I think the American approach to giving amnesty to people that should otherwise be prosecuted is more Utilitarian in its approach than in truth commissions, the principle is the same.

The fact of the matter is sometimes when it comes to enforcing justice, regardless of our definition of the word, we sometimes let the little fish go to catch the big fish. Although I can understand how it would make since to use such a method to catch criminals, if one of my family members was “off’ed” by the associate of the mob boss, I would still want him punished despite the fact that he helped catch the true mastermind behind the plan. I think it just goes back to the fact that most people, especially Americans, would rather have a redistributive form of justice than a restorative one just because the outcome is known and tangible.

Truth Commissions - What if full truth isn't always the best option?

On a personal level, whenever I'm upset about something, I always have the dilemma of choosing between dealing with the situation at hand (whether that be talking about it, crying about it, or confronting the issue head-on.) and trying to ignore it as best I can, and move on. Everyone has this choice to make, and we all have different ways of dealing with things. And quite frankly, it's hard to say that one way is better than another. It's just an individual, personal way of coping.

Today in class we talked a lot about why people have felt the need for truth commissions, and I understand those, and even agree to an extent, but I also have no trouble understanding places where truth commssions were not wanted. In Unspeakable Truths, Hayner devotes a whole chapter to this, called "Leaving the Past Alone". In the chapter she expands on the case of Mozambique, where a truth commission never took place. There was a 16 year war, where 1 million civilians were killed and thousands were tortured, that was ended by a peace agreement in 1992. However, "there has been almost no focus in Mozambique on accountability for past crimes." One fear is that bringing it up again, and talking about it again, might mean that it could happen again, it might be stirring up issues and emotions that are just below the surface. Another reservation is that a truth commission wouldn't be able to recognize the truth, that it would just turn into these intricate story weavings and everyone would start pointing figures and blaming everyone else.

She poses a ton of really thought provoking questions in the chapter, "Should a society's right to know the truth be turned into an unbending obligation? That is, if those persons most directly affected, the victims themselves, are not interested or not yet prepared to revisit these horrors, should they be obliged to do so? Could there sometimes be aspects of a conflict, a transition, or a people's culture and history that would make such truth seeking unattractive and unhelpful?" (185) Just like the question posed at the beginning of the book of whether people wanted to remember or forget, perhaps forgetting isn't the worst thing, and may even be seen as a form of justice by some. Hayner quotes someone she met in Mozambique as having said, "For not, we prefer silence over confrontation, over renewed pain. While we cannot forget, we would like to pretend that we can." (185)

Another thought I had was that perhaps it depends on the nature of the conflict that took place, as to whether a truth commission would be effective. In repressive military rules like in Chile and Argentina, where there was more of an elitist ruling class, maybe it makes sense that people were looking for answers, and demanding that people be held accountable for the disappeared and other human rights violations. But in a conflict such as the one that existed in Mozambique, a war that was so intricate, so hard to describe, that even families were split up on opposite sides fighting, perhaps it would be too painful and difficult to punish everyone responsible. In Mozambique they came up with their own version of justice, and they called it reconciliation, and to them it meant that life would go on, and they would work together and govern together, but they would not speak of the past. Hayner said that eventually, "a policy of 'reconciliation' was agreed to, which was understood to mean that there were crimes, that they were forgiven, and that there would be a general pardon." (192) One man that she spoke to said that even if he wanted answers or to bring up the past, he didn't feel like he had that option. He said that none of his neighbors would back him, they would say that they had all been through the same thing, and this was a community decision to leave the past in the past and move on. Even if the way that they are dealing with it doesn't leave anyone accountable, and probably isn't what we would typically call justice, can we say that this attitude is wrong?

Also, I looked up the Truth Commission in Greensboro, here's the link if anyone's interested... http://www.greensborotrc.org/
The Greensboro Massacre took place on November 3rd, 1979. The Truth Commission didn't take place until 2005. After almost 30 years, why was the truth of what happened that day worth looking into? What made this truth commission necessary? After such a long time, isn't it possible that it might be more painful to bring it up again, and delve so deep into the atrocities (and the causes and effects) that happened that day?

Solitary Confinement

This article will blow your mind. If you have ever doubted that solitary confinement is torture, read this. Britain has more successful options of rehabilitation that they have tried and tested. We are all culpable for this violation of basic human rights that serves no purpose (and for the most part, makes the situation worse.)

Click me.....

Torture Warrants

We’ve been talking a lot about torture over the past several days. I think its fair to say that our class has come to a general consensus that torture is unjust and immoral. However, I’ll play devil’s advocate just to be perverse.

In March of last year I read an article by a Harvard Law professor, Alan Dershowitz. In the past several years Dershowitz has become infamous for his stance on torture in the United States. He believes that torture is inevitable in the War on Terror. We are naïve to think that these “enhanced interrogation techniques” will not be used just because it is illegal (just take a look at Gitmo).

Dershowitz is not disillusioned by this; he argues, “Judges should have to issue a ‘torture warrant’ in each case. Thus we would not be winking an eye of quiet approval at torture while publicly condemning it.”

Because torture will inevitably be used it should be permissible if there is an "absolute need to obtain immediate information in order to save lives coupled with probable cause that the suspect had such information and is unwilling to reveal it.” In these cases, a government official could apply for a warrant and then be given legal permission to use approved methods of “enhanced interrogation.”

The procedure for receiving a warrant would be the same procedure necessary to receive every other type of warrant; the judge issuing the warrant must be a neutral and detached magistrate (precedent was established in Wolf v. Colorado). Furthermore, the government official must demonstrate probable cause before he is granted a “torture warrant.” Afterwards, the interrogator would be allowed to use certain techniques in questioning enemy non-combatants in the War on Terror.

A warrant requirement would provide a standardized method for interrogation techniques. Thus, interrogations would have governmental oversight. Certain actions would be proscribed so we can prevent the most barbaric violations (such as disembowelment) in favor of other methods (such as sensory deprivation and waterboarding). Officials in violation of these methods can be held accountable. Sanctions (imprisonment, fines, etc.) can be imposed.

It’s interesting to see the morality aspect ignored entirely in Dershowitz’s position. He doesn’t argue that the torture is justified. Instead, he insists that it is the lesser of two evils. Thus, the morality of torture is not directly at issue for Dershowitz (probably because the utility and morality are at odds) His perspective is undeniably bleak. but the real question is this: Is the torture-warrant proposed by Alan Dershowitz a moral surrender or is it a realistic tool for interrogating suspected terrorists?

Torture: Why?

When I hear the questions "Is torture ok?" and "Does torture work?", on a moral basis I'm almost offended, and I just want to say no quickly, I feel like I can justify being anti-torture for many moral reasons (seeing it as cruel and unusual punishment, and too severe of way to extract information from people, and stripping people of their dignity). However, I don't feel like I have much else to say to back that up. So I was really interested to read the "Does torture work?" Chapter that Dr. Johnson sent us.

In the chapter he breaks down his research by posing these 8 questions:
1. Can torture be scientific?
2. Can one produce pain in a controlled manner?
3. Does technology help torturers in this respect?
4. Can pain be administered respectfully and professionally?
5. Can interrogators separate deceptive from accurate information when it is given to them?
6. How accurately do co-operative prisoners remember information after torture?
7. Does this investigative method yield better results than others normally at an army's disposal?
8. If not, does this investigative method yield better results under conditions of constrained time?

Throughout the chapter, he basically goes on to answer all of these questions with "No." He poses the question, "Is anything better than nothing?" In instances where torture is the only way we know to extract information, is it worth it to try it to get that information? He answers that by saying that "the problem of torture does not lie with the prisoner who has information. It lies with the prisoner with no information. Such a person is also likely to lie, to say anything, often convincingly. The torture of the informed may generate no more lies than normal interrogation, but the torture of the ignorant and innocent overwhelms investigators with misleading information." (461)

So, for me, I am still left with an unanswered question. Why do we torture? If some people see it as morally reprehensible, and even morally unjustifiable, and studies show that it does not always yield the results (truthful information) that we are looking for, why do we still torture? Why do we still employ a tactic that strips people (and not always criminals) of their humanity, and inflict on them a pain until just short of death, when we know that it isn't always successful? I have a hard time letting go of things that I can't morally justify, and torture is certainly one of those things. To bring back in some of our old philosophers, Kant would say that torture is immoral because there is no way that we could universally will torture as an international law. I realize that Kant would also say that there's no way that we could see the future, so we wouldn't be able to know that perhaps the people we'd be torturing were innocent, or perhaps their confessions would be lies, but he would also say that we can't justify torture as a universal law, and so it is therefore unjust.

What Defines a Human Being? : The Biological Approach

Defined generally in seminar as rights that are so basic that they cannot be taken away, human rights are indisputable regardless of what a person has done. Significant problems arise when one is forced to define the parameters of a human being. The discussion in seminar at one point delved into the most basic scientific definition of a human. This entails living organisms with an extremely similar DNA structure. In spite of this, chimpanzees share 94% of the human DNA sequence and 99% of DNA that is actually transcripted. Many genetic puzzles exist under these restraints. Individuals with extra sex chromosomes or with translocated genes exhibit significant genetic differences from the “standard” human being. The natural direction is to turn to a phylogenetic tree. Humans and chimpanzees diverged from a common ancestor some six million years ago. The human “species” can be defined as organisms which are born to other humans and can only produce viable offspring with other humans. Sterile individuals would still be humans since they have not “evolved” to the point of being classified as another species.

Before the world became flat again through globalization, it can be argued that different isolated human cultures would ultimately usher in different species as they became adapted to their specific environment. For example, humans who have descended from African heritage have better survival rates when afflicted by malaria because of their genetics; moreover, certain types of traits are more prevalent in different cultures. This however would have taken millions of years. Biology theories can offer several hypotheses for human behavior and interactions over history; however, it is crucial to note that they fail to offer anything of moral value.

Evolutionists contend that the ultimate goal of an organism is to propagate genetic material. Made famous by Darwin, the theory of natural selection proposes that the most successfully adapted traits to specific environments will prevail, leading to their proliferation in future generations. To that end, organisms exercise fitness when their genes are passed to the next generation. Richard Dawkins, a contentious evolutionary biologist and vocal atheist, updated this theory in his book The Selfish Gene. He basically contends that the genes, or replicators, determine the actions of an organism, or vehicle, to such a degree that the most “successful” genes are the ones which act primarily in the interest of proliferation with little or no resistance from the vehicle. This theory helps deal with the notion of altruistic sacrifice; a mother sacrificing herself in order to save child preserves one of the closest genetic organisms to herself. It is a difficult theory to comprehend without attributing “semi-consciousness” to genes such as “selfishness” but this is the easiest way to put into terms why the most successful genes are the ones that make it to the next generation.

Despite the callousness of the theory, it can provide some answers to observed phenomena. For example, a mother is far more likely to save her own child over a complete stranger. This can be attributed to the fact that the daughter is of a far more genetic similarity and therefore the replicator acts in such a way to preserve its genetic identity. Interestingly, aging can also be explained as the replicator terminating the vehicle in order to alleviate resource competition for the young that also carry similar replicators. Since there are no morals, just the omnipresent law of replication of the closest genetic material, this theory can explain more sinister actions like racism or genocide as genes come in competition for resources with other more distantly related genes.

The difficulty in defining human beings happens at the fringes of the life spectrum. The Supreme Court definition best encapsulates the attempts in seminar to describe a human being as an organism which everyone would say, “I know it when I see it.” Could this be a function of the replicator, or genetic material, in all humans that acknowledges a greater genetic similarity to other humans over animals? Humans are far more likely to protect other human beings through legislation or action than animals. Those genes would also drive a human being to protect something with the potential to pass on the genes, such as a child, over the elderly, who can no longer reproduce. This can help explain why humans feel more at ease over the death of the elderly rather than the death of a child. It also would cause one to develop an affinity for whatever human beings shared the most similarities to the individual (with the exception of avoiding inbreeding depression). It describes something that can be best described by the word instinctual. It could also be a component of Hume’s “Natural Justice.”

After reading the evolutionist approach, one should note that there are no morals, no emotions, and no considerations to diversity: the sole motivating force is the replication of one’s genetic material. According to this theory, a human being’s only aim should be to propagate his or her genes and eliminate any obstacles to that end. Dawkins argues that at some point, humans being the example, an organism becomes intelligent enough to divorce its own interests from its genetic material. At this point, what a philosopher like Kant would call rational capacity, human beings can employ reason to define some sort of human rights. This can stem from reason, social contract, or another factor but something that human beings have come to realize as uniquely human. The ability of a human to recognize the difference in its aims from those of its genetic code allows one to generate some system of norms that protect human life regardless of genetic similarity.

Give me Death

In thinking about torture and the thought that torture is only guaranteed to produce false results, there is something that seems self-evident about this whole conundrum about torture and human rights:

Individuals who have pertinent information that any group would want are most likely trained to resist torture methods by governments and groups that use torture tactics in their own systems. Thus, it serves to support the above statement that results are only guaranteed to be false, to some degree. Consider yourself in the situation as a trained agent that holds a secret. You have been trained to separate yourself from pain and threats against family and friends. The torture begins. What do you do? If you are me or Farrel, for example, you would merely give up the secret immediately because you do not do well with the idea of unnecessary pain. If you are said trained agent, however, you resists. Then you provide false leads to temporarily relieve the pain. Then, when agents-of-pain return to torture you again (as trained agent), you retreat into your mind as one would with advanced meditation, a form not dissimilar to the unnatural/natural response to rape: to retreat to a place in the mind before the psyche is broken by a breaking experience. Thus, individuals who would generally have important information will be trained to resist torture methods. For those that torture would work with, I wager that they would not have any secrets worth having.

Walter asked us to consider a scenario in which humans could contract their human rights away. Is this possible? The Pseudo-Dionysius and Agustine of Hippo covered this issue, for me, in a construct evil and creation. They basically state that everything in creation contains some ousia (be-ing) and it cannot degrade itself to a point where it contains no ousia, otherwise it ceases to exist. That is something I ascribe to, personally, and it leads me to believe that all humans, so long as they live, contain the ability to learn and to become better individuals. Human rights cannot be taken away, ever, so long as a human lives. We are born into them and must demand that they stay with us until death. Torture is a fickle thing, able to produce shoddy results only some of the time. If we are so ready to torture individuals, why not use a polygraph? It is faulty, just like torture, but does not violate a human right.

I would rather be killed instantly and without pain for any crime I commit that would merit torture. I believe that imprisonment or death should be the choices in extreme situations of violence or acts against the state, not torture. On the farm, when animals turn on humans, such as in the instance of a stray, rabid dog, farmers shoot the animal- they do not torture it. We should treat humans with the same dignity, at the very least, as we would animals. Everyone begins to ask me, at this point, what would I say if someone had planted a bomb that would kill 200 people and torture could extract that information. I reply with the following: could it, with certainty, provide information? And are 200 lives not a price worth paying to maintain human rights for billions around the world? We must uphold the standard of human rights in ever circumstance or risk losing all human rights in the future.

I was wrong

I am not afraid to admit when I am wrong, so here is some evidence of such an occurrence.

This is a great post for those interested, and I encourage you to click on all of the links....they lead to very interesting info on the subject.
If you take a look at this blog you will find some compelling evidence that the death penalty is not especially effective. What does interest me however, is the claim that "In general, people believe harsh penalties deter misbehavior more than they do. (As Mark Kleiman's new book points out, certainty and immediacy of punishment are much more important [than the penalty itself])." This seems to get at the problem of implementation though. I may be wrong that harsher penalties are more deterrent, but that may be due to failure in implementation, in which case: would it be justified if it were an effective deterrent.

Also interesting is the claim that "I think death is an appropriate sentence for lifers who commit murders in prison - tacking on more years simply isn't a meaningful deterrent in that setting."

What should we do with such a person who we literally cannot stop from committing murders except by killing her?

It concludes by saying that this is far more complicated than any pollsters or thought games could account for.......so what is left for us to try to solve this problem: trial and error?

Torture is Moral

Okay, well no, torture is not moral, but my question is whether or not it can be. We talked extensively about torture as coercive means to information, but we did not touch so much on torture as a punishment. I alluded to such a proposition in my précis, but I want to hear more about how you all feel on this topic. Undeniably, torture fails to pull reliable information from its victims, who may or may not be innocent. As a means of punishment however, its effects may be more realizable. This all seems barbaric to me, but how far would this be from something like solitary confinement, life without parole, or the death penalty? The death penalty has been questioned on numerous occasions, but primarily because of the extensive wait on death row, coupled with the high costs of the litigation that is mandated. Lastly, the death penalty has resulted in innocent persons put to death, which is an utter atrocity. However, these are all failures of the system, not of the principle of violating a human's basic right. The system needs to be fixed, but the question of proper punishment still will arise again and again.

 

If a man rapes and kills a woman and her three children over the course of seven months, as her husband is forced to watch the entire thing, all of which he videotaped, what is the proper punishment for such a crime? Not only are there four people dead, there is a survivor who is probably worse off than most living humans. How can this man pay for his crimes? Or should we try to rehabilitate him? This is a topic worthy of another post, but, we are typically a retributive society which aims to punish more than it rehabilitates (which I personally think is a crime in itself), but even if we were a rehabilitating society, I doubt this man would qualify. So what should we do? Put him to death, life without parole, mental ward? I obviously do not have the answer, but why not chop off his extremities one by one over the course of a year, and let it be know what is being done….as a deterrent for all others. I do not believe that he has any rights at this point, so everything is fair game in my eyes (and this seems to be my main point, can one forgo all human rights if she/he steals a certain amount of others' rights?). Can one contract away one's life or rights, ever?

 

Undoubtedly though, the objection of torturers will be raised: we cannot have people in our society who we accept who would have to do the torturing. I would suggest robots…..something right before the valley of the uncanny.

 

This all makes me sick…..but the message "In Texas, they kill you back" always comes to mind. There is no significant decrease in murders there, and this may be due to failures in the system, or perhaps we cannot deter crime…….I just do not know. It seems like there must be a way to do a better job than jailing more people per capita than any other country in the world (while still retaining some of the highest crime rates).