Tuesday, October 6, 2009

Capacity to Reason

Immanuel Kant presented a philosophy known as deontology that is completely based on rational thought. Deontology deals with by describing how one should act based solely on rational calculations and the categorical imperative. The second formulation of the categorical imperative states that one should only act in a way to treat other human beings not only as a means but as ends in themselves. For Kant, living things without reason do not fit under the categorical imperative. Rational beings have value in themselves and therefore no other human has the right to take that life, in effect using them as a means. While I agree with most general principles derived from Kant’s philosophy, there are some problems in specific cases.

One I’ve thought about is brain-dead patients in a hospital. Because a brain-dead patient lacks the ability to formulate the categorical imperative they do not have the ability to reason. Under Kant’s principles, one would be equally just in killing a brain-dead patient as they would weeds in a garden. On the other hand, utilitarian principles would require a felicitous calculation to determine the just thing to do. While feeding tube removal from a brain-dead patient would cause extreme anguish to some, others could a similar distress and fear in knowing that they could be preserved in that state, a state that in effect robs them of a right to die. It would be impossible to balance the pain versus the pleasure in order to decide whether or not removing a feeding tube would be unjust. Hume as well fails to provide any guidance because although some would approve of the removal of a feeding tube, others would be horrified by it.

While deontology provides a concrete answer, where is the line drawn? Abortion advocates often claim that abortion terminates a ball of cells instead of a human being. At some point the fetus acquires a right to life shared with every other person on the planet. The Catholic Church used to point to the “quickening” as the moment the soul entered the body, but now we operate on a rather arbitrary standard of the third trimester. Even at that point though, would Kant have a problem with killing the fetus? The fetus lacks any sort of rational capacity and is unable to formulate his categorical imperative. Several young children would fail this rational capability test, but no one would claim it would be just to kill them. It is likely that Kant would say it is unjust to kill anything that has a capacity to reason. We presume that a fetus will develop cognitive function and become sentient. If that is the case, is abortion ever justifiable under deontology?

Going back to the brain-dead patient though, there is still no way to claim that it is unjust to allow them to die under Kant’s principles. People in comas or sleeping would have the ability to return to cognitive function but if the brain is literally dead how could they possibly return to rational thought? While I have mixed feelings about the result, I do think deontology succeeds in that it provides an answer to a question that neither Mill nor Hume can provide a definitive response.

Monday, October 5, 2009

Justice and Envy

I feel that at this point it might be useful to rearticulate the purpose of justice: something to protect the individual or the group. If Hume is correct that justice exists because of social constructs, then perhaps Marxist society would be ajust, or at least less concerned with the subject. But could that really be the case? Would people cease to envy other's beauty or charisma in a utopian (Humian) or Marxist world? If we shift the human focus from individual money and work to communal living, would we not learn to envy something else?

We are constantly creating norms of beauty, norms that generally stem from Hollywood, or other wealthy public individuals. This system creates ugly and beautiful people who are born into a world of norms; remove money (for Marx) and those elite few no longer control those norms. So who would take the place? I am hopeful that we would forget about such ideas, but, we would still desire entertainment in the form of movies, books, theater, etc. which must illustrate some ideal or theme. If these entertainment outlets are to be anything more than nonsense, they will portray how society thinks you should and should not act (given that government now controls all entertainment industries). Those forms of entertainment may portray values that not every person is entitled to experience.

The mute person may feel slighted at the notion of music as entertainment, the blind person at visual stimuli, the lower IQ at the large vocabulary used in theater. They could take out their frustration on another human, as that other human is seemingly valued more (and hence have a greater role; both in the government's portrayal of the ideal person and in the most important persons to economic stability). Importantly, note that it is what people conceive the situation to be that creates trouble and not necessarily the way the situation actually is. The only real way to stray from such problems would be to produce entertainment (and government) which is inclusive of every person. There can be no good or bad, only us; we can then hold the worst and best vocalist (and doctors) to be inherently equal, so that the worst vocalist has no reservations about his value in singing. But, it seems that this is just not how the world works. People are envious of their conception of beautiful things. And that is the construction of justice: the protection from envy of fellow human beings. Hume's conception of the utopian society which has no care for personal property still has concern for personhood, pride, courage, etc. We are animals first and foremost, like the apes we are territorial of whatever we can get our hands on, and though reason may allow us to supersede this, merely removing monetary incentives will not sufficiently stifle our nature. Do you ever really not want the best possible mate? And if someone got to him/her first, what would you do? This is the need for justice that both Marx and Hume fail to recognize, what do you think?

Perhaps a counterclaim could argue that we should do away with entertainment, and with it any sort of notion of what we could or should be. We are only informed of the way the world is (note that this is similar to Plato's idea to rid his city of poetry because of its inaccurate representations of the world, which is highly criticized).Aside from this, it seems that norms are here to stay, and though communism may rid our norms of the tinge of money, it does not rid us of human envy. And as I earlier inferred, envy seems to be the root of the most basic possible injustices, not property, and thus justice aims to protect the individual from other individuals.

Three Inherent Problems of a Marxist State

Since class on Friday, I’ve been thinking: Is a Marxist state a utopian society? Throughout this blog, I will be discussing Marxism in theory (not in its “practice” i.e. Stalinist Russia or Mao Zedong’s China).

Friedrich Engels defined Communism as “the doctrine of the conditions of the liberation of the proletariat.” But is the liberation of the proletariat really the answer to reaching a utopian society?

Inequality (or indirectly Capitalism), for Marx, is the source of all major societal problems. The destruction of property rights would provide complete equality and, in turn, end the “class struggle” and the societal problems associated with a capitalist society. Public ownership of the means of production is the key, defining concept to a Marxist state. The state would gradually confiscate all private property and industry so its citizens would share all goods and services. It is difficult to imagine how such a communist society would operate. The destruction of capitalism and complete nationalization of all industries and property is a radical thought.

With a remedy for the illness (capitalism), society can rid itself of the symptoms of the disease (greed, poverty, etc.) If, somehow, this system could be implemented then perhaps there would be no need for property, the monetary system, or religion (all of which are products of a capitalist society). Communism, in theory, would eliminate poverty, starvation, and worker exploitation (which was obviously a much bigger deal during the Industrial Revolution)

That being said, there are several glaring problems with Marx’s political philosophy. First, Marxism stifles the innovation and personal drive that capitalism promotes. Without profit incentives, a citizen has no motivation to work. There is no motivation to innovate and create new, more efficient methods of production. Society stagnates.

Secondly, it is unclear as to how a Marxist state would operate and maintain itself. The Communist Manifesto addresses the need for revolution and some general parameters for a Marxist state, but no clear guidelines for the maintenance of that state. This criticism has been voiced by a number of critics (most notably Bertrand Russell)

Thirdly, Marx’s philosophy seems to neglect natural human tendencies. To establish a Communist society, one individual must lead the revolution against capitalism. Once the battle is won, he must step down and join the proletariat. History has shown, however, that an individual who is given this enormous power is unwilling to step aside and join the masses. Stalin and Mao are classic examples of the natural human tendency for power. In other words, the process of reaching a communist society is difficult, to say the least.

Ultimately, to determine whether or not Marxism creates a utopian society, the question should be: what issue is the root cause of societal problems? If it is poverty and inequality, then perhaps Communism (in theory) is the most favorable

That being said, successfully starting and maintaining a Marxist state is another matter entirely…

Sunday, September 27, 2009

A question of effectiveness

I have found it very interesting to see how each new philosopher we encounter initially broaches the topic of justice. Of course there have been Plato’s rhetorical games with Thrasymachus, Aristotle’s supreme analogy, Hume’s thoughts on fellowship, and then well things like the musings of Kant. And as we have discussed before, while each has its own merits, some of these approaches seem to be more easily applied to daily life than others.

Especially evident in Mill’s encapsulation of justice, there is a certain intrinsic practicality that comes with utilitarianism because Mill seeks to reconcile the differences that arise between ‘objective reality’ and the subjective feelings which are inspired by it. And within this framework, our sense of justice is spoken of as a natural or instinctive phenomenon, driven by nature itself.

I believe this is an important distinction to make because it implies that divorcing our feelings from our sense of justice can never be satisfactorily achieved because one begets the other. Taking this idea into account when addressing something like the permutations of the trolley problem, adds yet another level of complexity to our seemingly simple moral dilemma. From our classroom, far removed from any tracks, bridges, or devices by which we are supposed to carry out this catch 22 scenario our concrete detachment gives us the ability to ponder each outcome, using logic, emotions, humor, or any other such devices we might choose.

However, if you could place yourself in the dead of a cold night, along a set of dark deserted railroad tracks in the presence of the trolley terrorists, I wonder what exactly would truly drive each of us to perform one action over the other. In other words, with time being of mortal consequence and with your hand clutching the cold metal lever of destiny, what would be running through your mind? Mill would of course argue that the best outcome would be that which saved the five individuals bound to the tracks, regardless of their felonious or non-felonious character. However, even if we choose this as the greatest good, the perception of this reality and the feelings associated with this outcome must be of equal consequence.

This is in fact a question that Mills uses to initially frame his conceptualization of justice when he states, “Is the justice or injustice of an action a thing intrinsically peculiar” or is justice “Only a combination of certain of those qualities presented under peculiar aspect.” This is certainly an interesting question because it would seem that the answer would betray how effective our studious conditioning would be in guaranteeing that the ‘correct’ choice is made when our hand is clutching the lever.

Hume, I think I like you

I have been out with the flu this past week so sadly I was unable to take part in the class discussions. However, after reading some of these blog posts I think I have a good idea of what was discussed in class. I think that something which interested me were Hume’s three rules. First, that moral sentiments are found in all men. I would have to agree with this. I mean I do not believe that there are people out there who are entirely evil, and are on earth to cause nothing but destruction. Even those who have committed terrible crimes must have some virtues, or have done some nice things in their lives. Second, that people praise and blame the same actions. I think this is completely true. An argument can be made for basically anything, and I feel that while most would blame one act there would be those out there who could make a logical argument for why it should be praised. Even something as terrible as murder, I will bet anyone that there would be an intelligent person out there who could make an argument for why it was not a bad thing. Maybe not good, but surly not bad. And then there are the little acts that occur in everyday life, such as someone holding the door for someone else. While most people would think such an action is kind and selfless, I know that there are others who would not praise this. They would argue that at the root of the action is personal gain and such an act should not receive credit. Also, the act of cheating: I have heard countless times the cheating is wrong and no one should ever do it. However I have also been told that if you are not cheating, you're not trying. Heck I think that is the motto of the New England Patriots. But back to the topic at hand, these are just several scenarios supporting rule number two. Rule number three, which states that praise and blame are not derived from self love. This last rule I feel is difficult to tackle because I am not sure I completely understand it. However, from what I see praise and blame are rational ideas and should not derived from self love. They should come from morals and ideas of the mind, not the heart.

I like these rules, and think that I relate with Hume more than any of the others we have read from thus far. He seems to have an open mind, and that human acts should be put into context and can be looked at from several different viewpoints. I also think that one can never really know the reasons behind another’s actions. It is impossible, you can't get inside their head and know their thought process nor can you know their past well enough to fully understand what has led them to where they are. Everything is up for argument and interpretation. I think Hume more than the others has fallen somewhere on this idea.

I'm Unjust. Sorry.

So I was just reading Walter's post about his appreciation for his major and the awesome ways that philosophy can affect our lives. I totally agree with this, except for with regards to the subject of our class. Here's the thing: I am an atheist, and I firmly believe that one day everyone will die and, afterwards, nothing we have ever done will matter. A man wiser than myself once said, "All we are is dust in the wind." While each of the readings help me to understand the importance of justice or its origins, they never compel me to act differently that I would have before those readings.
I can totally identify with Hume's explanation of the origin of justice, and I agree with (almost) everything that Mill says. The fact of the matter is that I don't care to make efforts to become a just person. I am one of the people Dr. Johnson was describing when she mentioned how people in our society make decisions based on utilitarian concepts, except for one minor detail. That idea would have me make choices which maximize pleasure for the most and minimize pain for the most. Instead, I pretty much always act in ways which maximize pain for me and minimize pain for me. Anytime I do typical "nice" things (hold the door for someone, etc), I can pretty much say I only do those things to benefit myself. I'm holding that door because I hope it'll make that cute girl smile at me.
So yeah. Basically, I enjoy these readings/discussions quite a bit, but in the end they just serve to make me feel like I'm somehow more selfish and meaner than the rest of you.

Utilitarianism in the context of the Categorical Imperative

After reading and discussing Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Mill’s Utilitarianism, a fusion of the two philosophies seems to be the idea closest to what I believe is justice. As stated in class, we are all in some respects Utilitarian. In the trolley example, all of us agreed that we would, or at least should, throw the switch. Seeing others suffer is painful to the majority of humans, and we would agree with the greatest happiness principle. Yet in order to reach this principle, we must, at times, treat others as means. This would go against what most of us think of as justice, for it violates the Categorical Imperative. We must accept this violation to live and govern justly, but we must also keep the Categorical Imperative in mind when making our decisions.

In execution we must adhere to Utilitarianism, but in principle we must strive to govern our actions by the Categorical Imperative. To be just we should limit our use of Utilitarianism through checks with the Categorical Imperative. A good example of this type of action or governing is the use of war. It can be justifiably used as a means to protect a great number of people through the sacrifice of a few. The few are treated as means, so it does violate the Categorical Imperative A country with a volunteer army obviously has the easiest job justifying the use of war, but with the incorporation of a draft makes the use of war more questionable.

Another example of justice as a mix between Kant and Mill’s philosophies is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If viewed directly with the Categorical Imperative in mind, then this action cannot be seen as just. Leveling cities with thousands of civilians in order to win a war cannot be seen as a universal law, and it also treats humans as means rather than ends. The decision was a very Utilitarian, for it was made in order to save lives of Americans and Japanese. There is not much of an argument against the fact that it saved lives, for it was a mere estimate that 1-2 million American soldiers would die upon invasion, which does not even account for the numbers of Japanese who would perish.

The justice of this decision depends on how much one holds the Categorical Imperative to be a governing principle. The action in itself cannot be said to be just, for it is not a universal law and it uses humans as a means. Yet, there is no way to predict the future. One can only judge what is right and wrong on the basis of a rational account, and there was reason to believe that this action would end the war a bring about less casualties. This decision adhered to the greatest happiness principle but violated the Categorical Imperative.

Impartiality and Rationality are the Keys

I think that Lindsey’s challenge is directed toward a very valid point.I believe that in order to fully accept or reject the argument of Jon Stuart Mill, one must have a firm grasp of their view on equality amongst human beings.Here lies the greatest obstacle we face in making a decision for the “trolley example.” In the multiple instances that I have discussed this situation, the first reaction is to ask who the individuals on the trolley are.Do they have families?Are they criminals?Are they a member of my family?
I am not clear on Mill’s view of equality, whether it only refers to equal liberty and rights or equality in value of human beings.I myself am referring to equality in the sense of skills and abilities amongst human beings.I believe that certain individuals are more important to society and are able to contribute on a greater level than others.While I know that many might disagree with me, this belief that I hold is important to my view for the trolley example.While I would pull the lever to kill the one person if I had absolutely no knowledge of who the individuals were, I certainly would have a different thought process if I was aware of who the victims were.If the single individual was a world class researcher from St. Jude’s and the five were factory workers with loving families, I believe the correct action would be to save the researcher because I believe he is more valuable to humanity.While this may stir outcry, I still believe that certain individuals are “worth” more, per say, so that order amongst humanity and progress may be maintained.
We generally praise examples of this as a society.In Air Force One, no one frets when a man takes a bullet for the president.While a situation such as that has not occurred to the public’s direct knowledge, there are still individuals who are supposed to protect the president at the cost of their own life, if necessary.
We have spoken a great deal of emotional losses and the effects they would have upon a trolley decision, and I believe that emotions should be completely taken out of the equation.Emotions are irrational, and founded in connections that we as humans have created.One might argue that we should protect one who has loved ones back at home, but really I believe we should be more rational and examine larger picture.Perhaps I am being cynical, but I truly see emotions as impeding our ability to make rational and impartial decisions.

What an Idealist

As a religious studies major, I find myself reading many texts that are liberation theologies and demand that certain justice and equity be extended to all humans. That said, when I come into contact with these philosophies I end up reading them with strange joy (for every reading, mostly) at seeing the same principles of hope and reciprocity laid out in these mini treaties, with variations, of course. But each call for some form of justice much clearer, I would suggest, than what we see today. That is, of course, because many set up ideal societies (like Plato) and they worked only because that philosopher made them work. All of this is relevant, I promise, because I saw this same situation working in David Hume, though I sense something very real and workable about his philosophy.

In Hume's ideal society, he does not rely on the mos intelligent or Wise individuals to become rules as did Plato, but instead chose to hold individuals accountable for establishing justice. His ideal society is set up only to contrast our real society, I believe, and to illustrate, perhaps, how we might look if we can work to achieve his goals. "The mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his feels" (Hume, 134). Justice is needed because we mess things up by worrying so much about our own personal interests and forget about the rest of humanity. Frederick Lassalle's ideal fourth class and the Jewish bourgeoisie of Imperial Germany embody the notion that if we care about neighbor and the "other" as much as we care about "self" we shall see improvement and, in time, have no further need for justice. What a concept (note sarcasm). I realize this is an Idealist notion, but is that not part of the purpose of these readings; to understand justice and to mobilize ourselves in this place and time to create change? Sure, we find ourselves in modern shipwrecks on a daily basis and ask ourselves, "Do I help my neighbor reach shore or do I, the more fit and deserving, make it myself and have more of the island's resources for myself," for example. When we study for an exam with friends or classmates, we always have a secret hope that we understand concepts better, will answer more elegantly, and set the curve for exams. We look upon our friend as "other," in many ways, and hope to excel beyond them. This bothers me so very much and I can scarcely explain why. Must be consistently be the best? The Guardians of our respective worlds, as Plato would have it? Or is it possible that we can embrace this small portion of Hume's work that he surely did not intend to be used in such a way so that "The whole human race would form only one family; where all would lie in common, and be used freely, without regard to property" (135)? It isn't fully possible, I understand, to be so benevolent that we no longer need justice, but why do we refuse to at least try?

Since my perfect world cannot exist and justice must be considered, how do we become fully just, developed individuals? Hume has a really delightful statement that I believe holds much truth, nothing that "the more we vary our views of human life, the newer and more unusual the lights are in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced, that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory" (138). This resonates with with the sympathetic strings when one is playing a string instrument. When one string vibrates, the vibrations cause others strings to also vibrate and justice becomes clearer as a result of this resonance. When we understand others and their positions and lots in life, we can more appropriately apply justice to their lives. Sally McFague, in Life Abundant, talks about a concept of "Wild Space," the places in our lives that don't fit nicely with those of everyone else's. They act as a window that can open our eyes and consciousness to other lifestyles, beliefs, and experiences. For each experience we have that gives us more insight (for example, being black, lesbian, disabled, gay, diseased, dying, or losing a child), we are able to better understand humanity as a whole, but especially individuals (McFague, 48). Perhaps this is the call that I make using this bit of Hume's writing: that we all seek to open ourselves to be resonators of the difficulties and oppressions of others and that we exact justice for those individuals that cannot speak for themselves or even see that injustices are being done to them.

When do we stop being descendants of the superior civilized Europeans that believe that we can take whatever we covet? It should not be the case that "whatever we covet they must instantly resign; Our permission [must not be] the only tenure by which they hold their possessions" (Hume, 138). What we must do, however, is allow our kindness and our understanding to be the first checkpoints for whether justice is being served or not. We must quit seeing ourselves as individuals and work together as a whole to lift those around us instead of seeking personal glory or property. "Boundaries of Justice wstill grow larger in proportion to the largeness of men's views and teh force of their mutual connections. Histoyr, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of huan sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become aquanted with the extensive utility of that virtue" (Hume, 140).

So, in my quest to apply these philosophies to my own life, today and each day after, I will seek to feel at least a little of what others feel. To wait for the slowest, for sooner or later we will all catch up with the fastest. I will promise to feel at least a little of the pain I have caused my enemies and to understand, in return, why our perspectives have differed. To feel oppression saves us from being oppressors and giving when we have abundance will, I hope, ensure that we have providers when the world has given us cold misfortunes.

Let us be strings that are willing to resonate sympathetically.

Mill and Hume

When we talked about Mill and the trolley problem in class on Friday, I just kept thinking back to Hume's ethical philosophy, and how I like, but also have problems with, both. I like Hume's idea that justice is never a matter of fact, that it does not exist in nature, and agree that justice could have begun as a matter of fact, but then had something added onto it, which is our own personal judgment. He also states that moral judgments are formed (not by reason) but by the sentiment of sympathy. And I agree with that. And I even agreed with his examples of a perfect society and a society in chaos when he said that neither of those was somewhere that justice applied. I think my major reservation about Hume lies in the 3 rules he stated to prove his theory. First, that moral sentiments are found in ALL men. Second, that men praise and blame the same actions. And Lastly, that praise and blame are not derived from self-love. My greatest problem is in #2, and I just wonder how Hume would justify that. Is he saying that because humans are rational beings, they find the same things to be good and bad? I worry that he is giving men too much credit. Hume calls human feeling the most general principal of human nature. And because of that, it just seems ridiculous to think that all men will agree on matters of good and bad. And I think it's easy to say that there are plenty of issues that currently divide our society, and these are issues that men do not praise and blame in the same way. What would Hume say about issues such as the Death Penalty (perhaps you could say that all men put blame on killing, but what about how divided people are over what to do with a man once he has killed someone else?), and abortion? Is Hume's theory too relative, or am I misreading this entirely?

I've been thinking about the trolley problem a lot this weekend, I even brought it up while at a bar with some friends on Friday night. I feel pretty confident in saying that if I were in that situation I would flip the switch and save the 5 people instead of the one. However, I do understand one of the main arguments against that, which was brought up in class. There is something to be said for the mentality of flipping that switch and actively choosing to kill that one person, instead of doing nothing, and allowing the trolley to continue on its intended path and unfortunately kill the 5 people. Perhaps this says something about the indifference that people often attribute to our generation, I don't know. When the trolley problem changed to include the fat man that we could push onto the tracks, it made me even more uneasy. But my biggest question is about how Kant would have looked at this situation. If you could push the fat man onto the track to save those 5 people, what would be the difference between throwing yourself onto the track to save those 5 people?

Death in the Name of Justice

I understand that many of you might be tired of discussing it, but I feel compelled to revisit the “trolley problem” and look at it from a different point-of-view. The original situation we investigated involved five people tied to a trolley track facing impending death, and we had the option to throw a switch and send the train onto an alternate track which would result in the death of one person. I asked myself, what if, instead being in the precarious position of choosing to “not save” one person or five, I was one of the six people whose lives hung in the balance in this unfortunate hypothetical scenario? How would I want the person at the switch to act in the context of justice?

First, what would our current three philosophers say? Hume says justice is based on the sentiment of moral sympathy, which is a principle of human nature and that, when making moral judgments we assess the usefulness and agreeableness of an action for the good of the whole. However, we do not have a natural inclination to always be just because sometimes it is against our own interests. Mill’s Utilitarianism is in concordance with the first part, i.e. we should act in a way that produces the greatest amount of pleasure for most and the least amount of pain. Kant’s Categorical Imperative states that we should act only in such a way that we can will the maxim of an action as a universal law.

So, as a victim of a train-track-tying terrorist, what would I want my possible savior to do? If I were included in the group of five, which our class agreed should be saved based on the utilitarian principle, I of course would want the person at the switch to save my group. This action seems to be just according to Mill, Hume, and Kant—the greatest amount of people are saved (implying that it creates a greater amount of happiness for more people and that it is more useful and agreeable for everyone involved), and it seems reasonable to will as a universal law saving five lives instead of one when given the choice. And, naturally, I would be happy because I would still be alive.

The real question is, what if I were the lone person tied to the alternate track? Like Hume says, my natural inclination toward justice would be obstructed because it is clearly in my self-interest to want my own life to be spared. But this, assuming that the other five people are intrinsically no better or worse than me and our families and friends would experience comparable amounts of suffering, is clearly unjust according to the principles of our philosophers. Would I, as the only victim out of six who actually dies, be able to recognize and accept my fate as a sacrifice in the name of justice? Would you?

Saturday, September 26, 2009

the "future" and kant.

In class on Friday, we talked about the trolly example. This brought to mind one of Kant's points from earlier in the week. Kant had many issues in particular with justices that could not be made into universal laws. The one that this blurb will focus on, is the problem of trying to predict the future. Kant says that we cannot rule justice in any way that attempts us trying to predict the future. The classic illustration of this that was given in class was the example of anne frank hiding from the Nazis. If we lied to the Nazis to protect anne frank, and siad that she ran out the back door, how do we not know that in fact she left her hiding place and began to run in exactly the direction that we indicated.
Now for me this is the same problem with the trolly example or any issue of justice. We simply cannot predict the future, in fact i think most people would agree that many things happen when we least expect them. But back to the trolly. If we do not flip the switch to save the five people for the one person, how is it that we don't know that if we had flipped the switch, it would not in fact derail the train and save everyone on the tracks, (also without injuring anyone on the trolly).The answer as Dr.J pointed out, is that we are constantly attempting predicting the future. Otherwise we would be paralyzed.
Now, I think, at lest for my own part, that when i predict the future it is many times involuntary, EX: i reach for a glass because i think it will still exist when my fingers touch it. But, this brings a question of how far into the "future" is considered the future. Surely everyone would agree that tomorrow is the future. But what about a mintiue from now? I think most people would agree on that as well, but what about 30 seconds? what about 15? 10? 5? 1/2? Surely now you see my point. What is the "future" and in a way is acting in the present simultaneously an act of predicting the future? I think that while if we were to try to live by this statement everyone would agree that we would wind up as Dr.J says "paralyzed in action". But i still think it is an interesting point to address and ponder. So the question is : If we act at all, are we not predicting the future and if yes, and our actions turn out to be correct, are we not disproving Kant's theory of not making judgements based on future predictions.

Utilitarianism for Dummies

Well, as a non-philosophy major who is attempting to stay afloat in this class of seemingly philosophically-gifted people, I am going to try to make sense of utilitarianism because, as I see it, this is something that (and yes, we said this in class) seems to actually apply to everyone's daily lives in today's modern world. In every sense. Whether we realize it or not. Granted, "justice" is supposed to apply to our daily lives as well ; ) ... but utilitarianism moreso than even the categorical imperative seems to be something that people do automatically, whether or not they can quote Kant or Mill.

Here is my reasoning for this. I believe that the categorical imperative is a great idea--and definitely a concrete way to define justice. Just like "treat others the way you want to be treated" and other cliches tend to idealize situations (because there is no way that we always treat others the way we want to be treated...everyone has those days), the categorical imperative states that humans should apply the maxim of their decisions to a universal law in order for it to be just. Therefore, lying to save someone or lying to not hurt someone's feelings is STILL unjust, though in some cases like Anne Frank, not necessarily immoral. (Please, class-- feel free to correct me if I'm wrong... I'm really trying to make sense of this all!) So we all pretty much agreed that while Kant would say that this is unjust, we all would still lie to save Anne Frank.

It is in applying utilitarianism to the Frank situation, however, that I believe utilitarianism comes to play when explaining why I would house her (or be a part of something like the Underground Railroad). Without any particular philosopher’s help, I would probably say, first of all, that I was helping Anne or slaves because I believe it is the just or right thing to do. If I successfully saved them, it would make me feel all warm and fuzzy inside…so YES I did do it to, in some twisted way, appeal to my own happiness as a human being. And if I didn’t help, I’d probably feel like a pretty rotten person for a pretty long while. Correct me if I'm wrong-- but isn't this utilitarianism?

In other daily situations, I believe that we all are utilitarian in that we do what appeals to our "happiness factor," in both small and big ways, or lower and higher pleasures. We hold the door open for the person behind us because of the joy we get when the person smiles and says "thank you" or because we think it is the right/nice thing to do... just like we feel bad when we slam the door in someone's face. If someone doesn't feel bad about doing that, then they are appealing to their own happiness by not paying attention to others and only to their self, and it obviously doesn't affect them in the slightest sense. We eat when we're hungry, help others out when they ask us a favor, volunteer at various places like hospitals (whether that's because we have the urge to help or because we want to boost our resume)... any and all of these situations appeal ultimately to our happiness as a person or we wouldn't do it in the first place.

Unfortunately, I don't really know where I'm going with this. What I do know is that even though we may NOT know the exact consequences of what is to come, we act in a way that we THINK the consequences will turn out well. There are times when people have good intentions and act utilitarially (so not a word... but work with me here!) like say your roommate does your laundry for you and accidentally turns all your white clothes pink. The consequences: not so good, not so happy, not the goal. But the intentions were to act in a utilitarian way, and I think that it's how I live my life and how most people live theirs.

Mill's Trolley Example

An issue that I had will Mill came up with the Trolley example, of whether it would be best to save five people or one. The problem I had with this example, and the way it encouraged us to think, was that it made people into numbers, or simply into things. For example, if the situation was that there was on one train track five iPods, and on the other one, it would seem obvious that the person manning the switch would choose to sacrifice the one for the others. Even after training down one iPod, there would five left to take its place, which would all still be useful to the person at the switch. They all have the same function, they all have the same worth, they are all entirely equal.
Just like the iPod, the trolley example encourages us to think of humans as having a similar function, as all having the same worth, and of all being entirely equal. Unlike the iPods though, where this is actually the case, for people I would argue that these are hardly ever exactly true. If the point of Mill’s example is to help our considers of which brings the maximum amount of pleasure, or least amount of pain, for the most, I wonder how accurately this could be measured. In class one conclusion seemed to be that the grief of five persons being killed would be more than if one person were killed, simply based on the numbers.
Why is it assumed though, that sacrificing one person for five is better? Just based on the numbers, five is more than one, and so we lose more if we sacrifice the five. If the five are killed in Mill’s situation though, why is that more of a loss, or a worse situation, than if the one is killed? Unlike the iPod, persons do not have certain functions such that saving five would help us most. Their lives could be argued to not even have a set amount of worth to us- what does it profit us to save five instead of the one? And the only thing making them equal in this situation is that they all have the equal potential to die by train. In Mill’s example, having removed all context that could possibly make this decision relevant to us, does it matter which switch is pulled?
I think our reaction to this situation reflects these issues. When we started discussing the example, there were lots of questions about whether the people were criminals, whether they had families, whether there any other ways to stop the trolley. This all seem the natural response we should have to this example. With a decision like this, we want and need more of a context to decide it in. I think this shows that whatever decision is made in Mill’s empty example that it isn’t really an accurate measure of the pleasure and pain scale, since the lack of context also takes away the reference points by which to judge which decision will bring the most pleasure and pain.
Even if there was context though, I’m not sure I like this example any more. If the context was that each person had a loving family, the look in class is that it would bring more pleasure and less pain to save the five persons on the track instead of the one. Doing so would decrease the potential amount of pain by decreasing the number of persons who feel the pain. I really wonder if it does though, and find it hard to quantify pleasure and pain like this. One person’s pain at losing a loved one to me is not less than the pain of five person’s pain at losing loved ones. I guess in other words I believe that all the suffering in the world can be felt from one death, and that increasing the numbers of dead does not equal an increase of the suffering felt.